Clemson University

TigerPrints
All Dissertations

Dissertations

5-2008

Social dominance orientation and reactions to
affirmative action policies and beneficiaries: A test
of the mediating effects of perceptions of racebased inequities and attitudes toward diversity
Ashanti Edwards
Clemson University, ashante@clemson.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations
Part of the Industrial and Organizational Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Edwards, Ashanti, "Social dominance orientation and reactions to affirmative action policies and beneficiaries: A test of the mediating
effects of perceptions of race-based inequities and attitudes toward diversity" (2008). All Dissertations. 216.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/216

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.

SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION AND REACTIONS TO AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION POLICIES AND BENEFICIARIES: A TEST OF THE MEDIATING
EFFECTS OF PERCEPTIONS OF RACE-BASED INEQUITIES AND
ATTITUDES TOWARD DIVERSITY

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Industrial and Organizational Psychology

by
Ashanti Edwards
May 2008

Accepted by:
Dr. Mary Anne Taylor, Committee Chair
Dr. Dewayne Moore
Dr. Fred Switzer
Dr. Patricia Connor-Greene
Dr. Robin Kowalski

i

ABSTRACT

In the present study, social dominance theory (SDT) was used as a framework for
understanding reactions to affirmative action policies and beneficiaries. Specifically, this
study examined how social dominance orientation, perceptions of inequities, and attitudes
toward diversity impact these reactions. The results of the study provide support for
several of the predictions derivable from SDT. Social dominance orientation (SDO) had
a direct influence on participants’ endorsement of two legitimizing myths: perceptions of
race-based inequities and attitudes toward diversity. Moreover, endorsement of these
legitimizing myths was directly related to support for affirmative action and reactions to
beneficiaries of affirmative action.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Affirmative action refers to those voluntary and mandatory efforts that an
organization undertakes in an attempt to prevent discrimination and ensure equal
opportunity (Crosby et al., 2003). Enacted to redress the effects of years of intentional
discrimination directed towards African-Americans, these policies began after the signing
of Executive Order 11246. In 1965 President Johnson issued the executive order
requiring all federal contractors to take “affirmative action” towards promoting the
inclusion of minorities in all aspects of hiring and employment (Crosby et al., 2006).
Based on the requirements of EO 11246, employers in both the public and private
sectors began developing various types of affirmative action policies. These policies
vary along a continuum and differ in the degree to which particularistic traits, like race
and gender, are taken into account when making hiring and employment decisions. For
instance, in compensatory policies no weight is given to particularistic traits in
employment decisions (Knight & Hebl, 2005). Instead, attempts are made to integrate
protected group members into the process before decisions are made. These attempts
typically involve practices such as targeted recruiting, training, mentoring, and career
guidance for minority group members.
A stronger form of affirmative action involves proportional selection quotas.
Using this type of policy, target group members are selected in direct proportion to the
number of qualified target group members in the applicant pool (Knight & Hebl, 2005).
As a result, protected group membership and individual qualifications are given equal
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weight in the decision process. Therefore, while this type of policy does involve quotas, it
does not result in the selection of unqualified minorities. In addition, these types of
policies are only permissible under extreme conditions.
A weaker type of affirmative action policy, soft preferential treatment, only
weights group membership as a “tiebreak” (Brown & Hirschman, 2006). In other words,
group membership is taken into consideration only when a protected group member is as
qualified as a majority group member. Thus, while particularistic traits are given a
significant amount of weight in the decision process, individual qualifications are also
taken into account.
While EO 11246 was specific to employment settings, it gave impetus to
subsequent federal education regulations and government advisories which allowed
institutions of higher education to take active steps in promoting the inclusion of racial
minorities in the student body, faculty, and staff (Moran, 2000). In order to attain
adequate representation in the student body many college and university leaders instituted
voluntary affirmative action policies that closely resembled the practices used in
employment settings.
Initially, many institutions implemented race-neutral procedures, like targeted
recruiting, in order to increase the number of protected group members in the applicant
pool (Crosby et al., 2003). At the same time, however, selective institutions also began
requiring SAT or ACT test scores for admission (Lemann, 1999). Given race-based
differences in scores on standardized tests, these early race-neutral efforts resulted in
little more than token integration.
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Subsequent college and university affirmative action policies focused on the
selection process to increase inclusion of minorities. While these policies took many
different forms, group membership was always considered in the decision process
resulting in race-sensitive admissions practices (Crosby et al., 2003). For example, many
colleges and universities have weak preferential treatment policies that treat race as a
“tiebreak” when deciding between equally qualified students. Other institutions have
adopted policies such as adding a constant number of points to the applications of
minorities. However, the Civil Rights Act of 1990 severely limited the ability of
universities to make such race-based score adjustments, increasing the challenges met by
institutions who wished to increase diversity. Still other institutions implemented
policies that included quotas or setting aside a specified number of slots for minorities in
order to ensure adequate representation of minorities in keeping with legally defensible
affirmative action programs.
The implementation of affirmative action in higher education was associated with
marked increases in the number of African-American students admitted into colleges and
universities. In 1965, African-Americans accounted for less than 5% of all undergraduate
students, 2% of all medical students, and 1% of law students
(www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/32/15/3215.doc). These numbers increased dramatically as
many institutions began developing race-sensitive admissions policies. In fact, for a brief
period of time during the seventies, African-Americans were slightly more likely to
attend college than their white counterparts with similar socioeconomic and geographic
characteristics (Jaynes & Williams, 1989).
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As the number of African-American students admitted into colleges and
universities grew, the constitutionality of voluntary affirmative action practices was
legally challenged on numerous occasions. In Defunis v. Odegaard (1973), the
University of Washington’s affirmative action program was challenged by a white
applicant denied admission to its law school. The white student claimed that the program
was a form of reverse discrimination. The state trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff
and ordered that he be admitted into the law school. However, the school’s affirmative
action policy was ultimately upheld when the state Supreme Court overturned the lower
court’s ruling and the United States Supreme Court dismissed the case.
The first major setback to affirmative action in higher education came in the
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) case. Allen Bakke challenged the
medical school at the University of California at Davis’ policy under the 14th Amendment
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 after being denied admission in successive
years. The medical school’s policy, known as the Davis Plan, maintained separate
applicant lists for whites and minorities and set-aside 16 of the 100 admissions slots for
racial minorities and economically disadvantaged whites. The trial judge deemed that the
policy violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, as well as, Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the California state constitution. After several appeals
by the university, the United States Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the Davis Plan was an
unlawful quota system. However, while quotas and set-asides were banned without
statistical evidence of racial imbalances, treatment of race as a “plus” in admissions when
all other qualifications were equal was permitted. Another important by-product of the
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Supreme Court’s decision, written by Justice Powell, was that it established diversity as a
basis for race-based preferences in college admissions.
Over the next twenty-five years, the Supreme Court would fail to render any
decisions on the issue of affirmative action in higher education. In 2003, however, the
Court would submit judgments in two affirmative action cases heard in tandem involving
the University of Michigan. These judgments served to more clearly explicate the
Court’s position on race-sensitive admissions practices.
In Gratz v. Bollinger, two white students were denied admission to the
undergraduate school while minority candidates with lesser qualifications were admitted,
and subsequently challenged the university’s practice of automatically adding points to
minorities’ admissions scores. The Supreme Court ruled that this practice did not meet
the standards of strict scrutiny since the system weighted race in such a way which
virtually ensured that every minimally qualified minority applicant would be admitted.
In Grutter v. Bollinger a white woman sued the University of Michigan Law
School after being denied admission while minority students with lower grades and test
scores were admitted. In the judgment, the Supreme Court upheld the 1978 Bakke
decision citing diversity as a compelling state interest in state-sponsored schools. Taken
together these decisions suggest that universities may implement race-sensitive
admissions policies to promote diversity, but only as part of policies which assess each
applicant individually. Consistent with the CRA of 1990, the discretion of educational
institutions to use affirmative action in admissions is more limited than ever before.
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Despite the Supreme Court rulings upholding certain forms of affirmative action,
the policy remains a popular topic in public and political discourse. Moreover, the policy
appears to have very polarizing effects on society. As a result, attitudes toward the policy
receive a great deal of attention in the social science literature. The current study
examines attitudes toward affirmative action in higher education. While there is little
empirical research on attitudes toward affirmative action in higher education from which
to draw conclusions, the policy follows essentially the same practices as in employment
settings. Therefore, findings from employment settings should be relevant and
generalizable to educational settings. In fact, past research suggests opposition to
affirmative action may be more severe when applied to university admissions (Schuman
et al., 1997).
In the current study, social dominance theory is used as a guiding framework for
understanding the dynamics underlying reactions to affirmative action. Social dominance
orientation, perceptions of racial imbalances and attitudes toward diversity will be used to
predict reactions to an affirmative action policy. A soft preferential treatment policy was
chosen for this investigation since this form of affirmative action has been able to
withstand legal scrutiny and is often used in educational settings. We also examine
perceptions of affirmative action beneficiaries as predicted by these attitudinal variables.
Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action Policies
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in the Bakke case, affirmative action has
become one of the most controversial social policies in the United States. Findings
regarding predictors of attitudes toward affirmative action have been inconsistent, but
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researchers have started to identify specific aspects of the policies, evaluators and the
beneficiaries that predict resistance or acceptance of affirmative action and of
beneficiaries.
As a first step in the current study, we review existing research in this area.
Although this provides useful information for understanding the factors that predict
resistance, much of this early work is atheoretical. It does, however, provide a basis for
predicting which aspects of affirmative action policies, evaluator characteristics, and
beneficiary characteristics are related to fairness perceptions. In a second step, we review
early theoretical work suggesting that self-interest and racism may impact attitudes
toward the policies. Finally, we turn to SDT as a means of understanding and extending
these early findings and formulating hypotheses for the current study.
Characteristics of the policy
Levels of support for the policy vary as a function of several factors. One of these
factors appears to be the amount of information provided about the affirmative action
policy. Past research suggests that individuals tend to equate affirmative action with the
use of quota systems when provided with little or no information regarding the specific
practices used in implementing the policy (Kravitz et al., 1997). Reactions to this type of
policy are the most severe and tend to be consistently negative. However, the actual use
of such policies is very rare and, in all but the most restricted instances, the policies
would be considered illegal.
Attitudes toward affirmative action tend to be more positive for policies
containing more realistic practices. However, differences in attitudes are still found
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depending on the strength of the policy. “Soft” forms of affirmative action are raceneutral and include practices like outreach programs, mentoring, and targeted recruiting.
In other words, demographic characteristics are given no weight in selection decisions.
Rather, these practices focus on increasing the number of qualified minorities in the
applicant pool. In contrast, “hard” forms of affirmative action are race-conscious and
involve preferential treatment for members of protected groups. For example, using race
or gender as a tiebreaking factor when two individuals are equally qualified is a “hard”
form of affirmative action. In general, race-neutral forms of affirmative action
consistently receive much greater support than race-conscious forms of the policy
(Kravitz & Platania, 1993; Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000). A likely explanation for this
finding is that race-neutral policies take merit into account moreso than race-conscious
policies (Tougas, Crosby, Joly & Pelchat, 1995).
Knight and Hebl (2005) replicated these findings within the context of higher
education. Specifically, they found that the degree to which admissions policies
evaluated applicants on the basis of universalistic characteristics, like qualifications,
rather than demographic characteristics influenced reactions toward the policies.
Specifically, respondents regarded the policy involving targeted recruiting of minorities
more positively than policies involving proportional selection quotas and preferential
treatment. Moreover, participants indicated greater support for the proportional selection
quota policy than the weak preferential selection policy.
Consistent with findings in employment settings, as the weight attached to
particularistic characteristics is increased, perceptions of fairness tend to decrease. In
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addition, perceptions of fairness and ratings of beneficial outcomes associated with the
policy decreased as the amount of weight the policy placed on demographic factors
increased. Taken together, these studies underscore the need to provide specific details
about the affirmative action policy in order to provide evaluators with a deeper
understanding of the nature of the policies and increase acceptance of more moderate
policies (Doverspike, Taylor & Arthur, 2000). In this study, attitudes toward a weak
form of preferential treatment, commonly called “soft” preferential treatment, will be
assessed.
Other predictors of reactions to the policies include characteristics of the
evaluator. An evaluator is any individual who reviews and makes a judgment regarding
the fairness, benefit, or need for a particular affirmative action policy. However, studies
typically target students or workers to make these judgments. While this work is also
rather atheoretical in nature, a review of the existing data allows us to understand which
aspects of an evaluator may prove to be relevant in a more theoretically based
examination of the policy.
Demographic characteristics of evaluators
Affirmative action attitudes also appear to be influenced by demographic characteristics
of the attitude-holder. With few exceptions, women tend to be more supportive of
affirmative action than men (Konrad & Linnehan, 1995; Kravitz et al., 2000; TaylorCarter, Doverspike & Alexander, 1995). This finding appears to be true for both “soft”
and “hard” forms of the policy (Ozawa, Crosby & Crosby, 1996). However, the effect
may be more pronounced for “hard” policies than for “soft” policies. For example,
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women were found to have more positive attitudes than men toward an affirmative action
policy that involved a quota system (Summers, 1995). However, women and men did not
differ significantly in terms of their evaluations of policies composed of either a special
training program or differential scoring of tests.
Similar findings for the effects of evaluator demographic characteristics on
attitudes toward affirmative action have also been observed in student samples. Kravitz
and Platania (1993) found that female undergraduates expressed more positive attitudes
toward non-specific affirmative action policies than male undergraduates. In addition,
the female undergraduates evaluated specific structural components of potential
affirmative action policies more positively than their male counterparts. For instance,
women provided greater support than men for both “soft” and “hard” forms of
affirmative action policies consisting of recruitment, training and quotas. Moreover,
women were more likely than men to endorse requiring all organizations to have
affirmative action policies and providing workforce composition data in an affirmative
action plan to the federal government. Finally, women had more positive attitudes than
men toward using affirmative action to compensate for past discrimination.
Reactions to affirmative action also differ as a function of the ethnicity of the
attitude-holder. However, the effect of evaluator ethnicity on attitudes toward the policy
may often be more ambiguous than the effect of gender. For instance, Latinos have
exhibited varying levels of support for affirmative action across several studies. Swain
and colleagues (2001) found that, among Latinos, levels of support for the policy closely
resemble those of African-Americans. Nonetheless, other studies suggest that support for
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affirmative action among Latinos generally falls between that of African-Americans and
whites, unless the policy specifically targets their ethnic group (Bell, McLaughlin, &
Harrison 1996; Kravitz & Platania, 1993; Kravitz, Stinson & Mello, 1994). Similar
findings have also been obtained in regards to support for specific structural components
of a potential affirmative action policy (Kravitz & Platania, 1993). In contrast, AsianAmericans tend to exhibit reactions to affirmative action similar to those of whites
(Swain et al., 2001) or they express ambivalence about the policy (Inkelas, 2003).
Racial differences in attitudes toward affirmative action are the most pronounced
when comparing whites and African-Americans. By and large, African-Americans tend
to be much more supportive of affirmative action than Whites. Kinder and Sanders
(1990) found that affirmative action in employment was strongly favored by 64% of
African-American respondents compared with only 6% of White respondents. In
addition, White males tend to be the least supportive of the policy (Niemann & Dovidio,
1998). This appears to be the case for both global attitudes toward affirmative action and
attitudes toward specific types of affirmative action policies, including equal opportunity,
preferential treatment and quotas (Sigelman & Welch, 1991).
Differences between African-Americans and Whites in terms of attitudes toward
affirmative action have also been observed in college samples. Kravitz and Platania
(1993) found that African-American students had more positive attitudes toward
affirmative action than White students. Differences were also found between the two
groups in terms of evaluations of specific structural components of potential affirmative
action policies. For example, African-Americans were more supportive of policies
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consisting of recruitment, training, weighting of demographic status, and quotas.
Moreover, African-Americans also exhibited greater endorsement of implementing
affirmative action to redress past discrimination.
Several studies have tested this relationship in more realistic situations with
similar findings. These studies examined managers’ reactions to various types of
affirmative action policies. Overall, endorsement of preferential treatment based on race
in hiring and promotion decisions tends to be significantly higher among AfricanAmericans than among Whites. While Konrad and Linnehan (1995) found no difference
between African-American and White managers’ evaluations of an affirmative action
policy containing race-neutral procedures significant differences were observed between
the two groups when evaluating a policy containing race-conscious procedures.
Specifically, the African-American managers responded much more favorably to the
policy which weighted demographic characteristics.
Similarly, Bell and colleagues (1996) found that attitudes toward affirmative
action were most positive among African-Americans, but this effect was mediated by
respondents’ beliefs about affirmative action. Thus, the more negative reactions
exhibited by Whites are likely due to them having more extreme beliefs regarding the
specific components of the policy. Based on the samples used and the type of policies
examined, these findings have real-world implications for the implementation of
affirmative action in organizations. Since the policy may not receive complete support
from the decision makers within the organization, it may be implemented less effectively.
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The current study examines attitudes toward affirmative action in an educational
setting involving college admissions. Past research suggests that racial differences may
be exaggerated with respect to attitudes toward affirmative action in such admissions
decisions (Schuman et al., 1997). A survey conducted by Kinder and Sanders (1990)
found that while almost two-thirds of African-Americans strongly support the
implementation of affirmative action to increase access to higher education for racial
minorities less than 10% of whites share this view. It seems reasonable that AfricanAmericans would be more supportive of affirmative action since they are likely to benefit
from the policy, and they generally rate the policy as more fair than whites. However,
there is evidence that the gap between African-Americans and whites in terms of support
for affirmative action is widening (Kinder & Sanders, 1996).
In sum, the research reviewed suggests that the gender, ethnicity and race of the
respondent are often significant influences on attitudes toward affirmative action policies.
If one focuses only on demographics and not on the underlying variables that may be
driving resistance to affirmative action, it does not allow us to understand opposition to
the policy. From a methodological standpoint, it is important to ensure that these
characteristics are measured and their impact on fairness perceptions evaluated. From a
theoretical standpoint, it is important to examine whether these differences may be
explained by differing underlying attitudes toward the policies. In the current study,
demographic data will be gathered and the impact of these factors on the dependent
variables will be assessed.
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A second factor that predicts reactions to affirmative action involves
characteristics of the beneficiary. As one would expect based on the discussion of
evaluator characteristics, factors such as the race and gender of the beneficiary have a
significant influence on evaluations, and may interact with evaluator characteristics in
some instances to predict reactions to the policies. The next segment contains a
discussion of these variables.
Demographic characteristics of the beneficiary
Another factor that influences reactions to affirmative action is the identity of the
protected group targeted by the policy. Past research indicates that affirmative action is
often perceived as more acceptable for some protected groups than for others. For
example, affirmative action programs intended to benefit the disabled are viewed more
favorably than those that benefit either women or African-Americans (Kravitz &
Platania, 1993; Murrell, Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner & Drout, 1994).
While affirmative action for women may be viewed less positively than
affirmative action for the disabled, policies that target women garner more support than
those that target African-Americans (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). This appears to be the
case for many segments of the population. Both liberals and conservatives displayed
higher levels of support for affirmative action when women, rather than AfricanAmericans, were targeted by the policy (Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock & Kendrick, 1991).
Similar results were observed among both educated and uneducated Whites, as well.
However, for those with at least some college education, government intervention
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received greater support for women than for African-Americans only among
conservatives.
Similarly, Clayton (1992) found that, when told two fictitious companies were
attempting to recruit more employees overall, respondents reacted most positively to the
targeted recruiting of women and most negatively to targeted recruiting of AfricanAmericans. This finding is particularly interesting given that respondents were told the
companies were composed of 40% women and 25% African-Americans, respectively.
These results are not surprising since, in general, Whites tend to react most negatively to
affirmative action policies that specifically target African-Americans (Bobo & Kluegel,
1993). However, ratings for affirmative action targeting African-Americans indicated
that female respondents were more comfortable with minorities than male respondents.
Therefore, Clayton’s (1992) findings also demonstrate that rater characteristics often
interact with beneficiary characteristics to influence attitudes toward affirmative action.
These findings are particularly relevant since the present study examines reactions to a
race based affirmative action policy that targets African-Americans. It is important to
note that our results may or may not generalize to reactions to other racial groups, or to
reactions to gender-based affirmative action.
Early theory: Self-interest and racism as attitudinal predictors
While policy characteristics and demographic factors are empirically related to
reactions to affirmative action, studying these variables does not allow us to understand
the underlying dynamics of support for the policies. In order to grasp the psychological
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basis of reactions to affirmative action, researchers have turned to social-psychological
perspectives.
One social-psychological perspective attempts to explain attitudes toward
affirmative action in terms of judgments of deservingness. The extent to which an
individual makes a judgment of deservingness for a particular group is influenced by the
characteristics of both the evaluator and the target (Crosby et al., 1996). Judgments of
deservingness for various groups may also be, at least partly, determined by self-interest
since interactions often emerge as a function of the “fit” between evaluator characteristics
and the characteristics of the intended beneficiary. Research in this area has examined
the influence of self-interest in a number of ways. Economic self-interest is typically
defined in terms of competition between groups for jobs, promotions, and other scarce
economic resources (Kluegel & Smith, 1983). It seems reasonable that members of
groups that do not benefit from affirmative action would not judge protected-group
members as deserving of special help since it would potentially put them at a
disadvantage when competing for these resources. As a result, opposition to the policy
should be greater among members of non-protected groups.
A number of studies have provided support for this assumption. For example, a
1978 national survey of Whites found a significant relationship between attitudes toward
affirmative action and self-interest. Significant correlations between attitudes toward
affirmative action and self-interest were also obtained in a sample of 450 employees in a
large Canadian firm (Tougas & Beaton, 1993). Moreover, attitudes toward affirmative
action were also related to self-interest in a sample of Hispanic undergraduates (Kravitz
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& Meyer, 1995). Finally, Kluegel and Smith (1983) found that economic self-interest
was significantly related to attitudes toward programs that involved withholding a
specified number of positions for African-Americans in colleges and in business.
Altogether, these findings suggest that competition for economic resources may influence
judgments of deservingness for various groups and, by extension, attitudes toward
affirmative action policies.
A related construct extends the view of self-interest. Collective self-interest
includes the anticipated effects on one’s demographic group (Tougas, Beaton & Veilleux,
1991). It seems reasonable that the effects on one’s own group would be taken into
consideration when evaluating affirmative action since the policy is designed to redress
discrimination based on group membership. While many factors may impact support or
opposition to affirmative action, one variable that may impact support of policies is
collective self-interest. Members of different demographic groups may be expected to
support policies that will be advantageous to them and oppose policies that will be
disadvantageous to them (Paterson, 1997). Tougas and colleagues (1995) reported
findings consistent with this statement. Among several samples of male students and
male employees, attitudes toward affirmative action in general and strong affirmative
action policies targeting women were related to individuals’ beliefs regarding the effect
of the policies on one’s social group.
An alternative explanation for the varying judgments of deservingness made for
different groups, which results in opposition to affirmative action, is racism. Fernandez
(1981) defined anti-Black racism as a basic belief system in which Whites are inherently
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superior to African-Americans, solely on the basis of race. In addition, this belief system
is hypothesized to be very pervasive because “Whites have the power over social
institutions to develop, evolve, nurture, spread, impose, and enforce the very myths and
stereotypes that are basic to the foundation of racism” (p. 303). This classical form of
racism typically results in overtly discriminatory behaviors directed toward AfricanAmericans that may even be displayed by well-intentioned Whites (Frazer & Wiersma,
2001; Jacobsen, 1985). This implies that direct measures of racism and opposition to
affirmative action should be highly correlated with one another (Federico & Sidanius,
2002; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1996). In addition, contrary to previous assertions, there
is growing evidence that this relationship may be stronger for more educated Whites
since they are better able to link racial attitudes with abstract political ideologies
(Federico & Sidanius, 2002a; 2002b; Sidanius et al., 1996).
Despite evidence demonstrating that direct measures of racism predict opposition
to affirmative action, many argue that as political correctness becomes more important in
American society many individuals are motivated to suppress overt expressions of racism
(Maddux, Barden, Brewer & Petty, 2005). As a result, old-fashioned forms of racism
have been replaced by more modern forms of racism. One type of modern racism,
symbolic racism, is characterized by racial prejudice and a politically conservative
ideology (McConahay, Hardee & Batts, 1981; Kinder & Sears, 1981). In other words,
symbolic racism combines anti-Black affect with a belief in traditional American values.
This belief system allows Whites to maintain racial exclusion while applying standards
equally to Whites and African-Americans. Therefore, while old-fashioned racists may
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openly commit discriminatory acts against Blacks or other minorities, contemporary
racists privately hold prejudiced attitudes but avoid overt expressions of prejudice.
Rather, modern racist beliefs manifest themselves in abstract values and principles
(Kinder & Sears, 1981). Because of this, prejudiced and discriminatory acts committed
by contemporary racists are likely to be attributed to African-Americans’ violation of
traditional American values.
Similar to measures of old-fashioned racism, self-report measures of modern
forms of racism have also been found to predict opposition to affirmative action policies
targeting racial minorities. For example, in a 1978 national opinion survey, symbolic
racism predicted opposition to affirmative action policies such that individuals scoring
higher on the measure of racism exhibited higher levels of opposition to the policy
(Jacobsen, 1985). Kluegel and Smith (1983) obtained similar results for a two-item
measure of symbolic racism in both educational and business settings. However, there is
growing evidence suggesting that modern forms of racism have a stronger relationship
with attitudes toward affirmative action (Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo & Kosterman, 1997;
Williams et al., 1999). A recent meta-analysis of affirmative action research provided
additional support for this assertion by demonstrating that contemporary forms of racism
are better predictors of opposition to all forms of affirmative action across educational
and employment settings (Harrison, Kravitz, Mayer, Leslie & Lev-Arey, 2006). Overall,
studies examining old-fashioned and modern forms of racism suggest that, despite recent
advancements in American society, attitudes toward affirmative action continue to be
influenced by affective reactions to African-Americans (Ariola & Cole, 2001; Bobo,
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1998; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Bobcel et al., 1998; Sidanius et al., 1996; Sniderman &
Piazza, 1993).
Summary of reactions to policies
The research reviewed indicates that several types of variables are associated with
negative attitudes toward affirmative action. Structural characteristics of the policy
influence reactions such that, all else being equal, stronger forms of affirmative action are
evaluated more negatively than softer forms of the policy. However, demographic
characteristics of both the attitude-holder and the target group often have stronger effects
on attitudes toward affirmative action than the structural characteristics of the policy. For
example, White males tend to display higher levels of opposition to affirmative action
than African-Americans, Latinos, or women. In addition, resistance to the affirmative
action is greatest when the policy targets African-Americans.
Several explanations have been proposed to account for these effects. Kluegel
and Smith (1983) suggest that opposition to affirmative action is based on self-interest, or
the anticipated consequences of the policy for one’s self and members of one’s social
group. Another explanation is that reactions to the policy are largely based on anti-Black
affect. It is important to identify the underlying causes for negative reactions to the
policy since these reactions may often have unintended and severe consequences for
beneficiaries of the policy.
Attitudes toward affirmative action are typically measured in terms of evaluative
reactions, such as approval or support for the policy. However, it is also important to
understand the implications of these evaluative reactions for beneficiaries of the policy.
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Research suggests that a consequence of negative attitudes toward affirmative action is
that these attitudes may “spill-over” onto beneficiaries (Barnes-Nacoste, 1992).
Therefore, it appears that negative evaluations of the policy may lead to negative
evaluations, of and emotional reactions to beneficiaries of the policy.
Spillover Effects: Attitudes Toward Beneficiaries
An interesting issue in affirmative action concerns the relationship between
evaluations of the policy and affective reactions to beneficiaries of the policy. Since
redistributive policies, like affirmative action, concern the allocation of economic and
material resources, it seems reasonable that such policies would receive little support
from those who do not benefit from them. In addition, it may be the case that
competition over these resources may result in hostility and negative attitudes towards
those who do benefit from the policies. Indeed, research suggests that perceptions of
affirmative action influence reactions to beneficiaries of the policy (Barnes-Nacoste,
1992).
Breckler’s (1984) research on attitudes suggests that they consist of three distinct
components, including affect, behaviors or behavioral intentions and cognitions. Based
on this, in the present study three separate aspects of attitudes toward affirmative action
beneficiaries that correspond with Breckler’s attitudinal components will be investigated.
First, affective or emotional reactions to African-American beneficiaries will be assessed.
In order to tap the behavioral component of attitudes, willingness to work and socialize
with beneficiaries will also be examined. Finally, the cognitive element of attitudes will
be is assessed in terms of perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities.
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Evaluations of beneficiary qualifications
One way that negative attitudes toward affirmative action influence reactions to
beneficiaries is in the devaluing of their qualifications. In an effort to expand recruiting
efforts, many organizations may publicize their affirmative action policies. Yet, research
indicates that when an organization is known to have an affirmative action policy
individuals tend to assume that beneficiaries are less qualified (Heilman, Block & Lucas,
1992). For instance, Northcraft and Martin (1982) found that when respondents were
informed that a company needed to hire an African-American to satisfy its affirmative
action obligations, they were more likely to match the Black employee with the weakest
resume. However, this was not the case when the company’s affirmative action
obligations were not mentioned.
A common criticism of this line of research is that attitudes have changed since
the 1990’s and it is, therefore, no longer as relevant. However, several recent studies
demonstrate that beneficiaries’ qualifications may be discounted when demographic
characteristics are considered in selection decisions. For example, Heilman and Welle’s
(2006) results indicate that a stigma continues to exist for African-Americans when race
is taken into account in employment decisions. Specifically, African-American
employees were perceived as being less competent and influential than their White male
counterparts when a diversity, rather than a merit, rationale was given as the basis for
selection of individuals in a work group.
Similarly, Elkins and colleagues (2003) found that when competence was not
explicitly stated as the basis for the promotion of a female employee, individuals
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attributed the employment decision to the organizations’ affirmative action program.
While this study defined beneficiaries in terms of gender rather than race, the findings are
informative. Since reactions to affirmative action tend to be most extreme for policies
that target African-Americans it is reasonable to assume that the “spillover” effects
associated with the policy would be more extreme for African-Americans, as well.
Therefore, these studies illustrate that, despite recent advancements in intergroup
relations, African-Americans continue to be perceived as incompetent when race
provides a plausible explanation for employment decisions.
Negative evaluations of beneficiaries’ qualifications may be even more
pronounced when affirmative action is perceived to be an important factor in selection.
Among a sample of white males and female undergraduates, a minority applicant was
evaluated less favorably when commitment to affirmative action was emphasized than
when it was not (Garcia, Erskine, Hawn & Casmay, 1981). However, these findings may
be due to a lack of information being provided about the affirmative action policies. In
the absence of an explicit definition of the affirmative action policy, individuals tend to
assume that stronger forms are used (Heilman & Blader, 2001; Kravitz et al., 1997).
Therefore, respondents may have believed that group membership was more heavily
weighted than qualifications.
When demographic characteristics are heavily weighted in the selection process
African-Americans are expected to be stigmatized to a greater extent. A recent study by
Evans (2003) clearly illustrates this point. African-Americans’ achievement-related traits
were discounted only when selected under illegal hiring practices containing strong racial
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preferences. When the hiring procedures involved a legal form of affirmative action
which takes race into account only to select between two comparable applicants the
qualifications of African-Americans were not rated lower than those of Whites.
Therefore, it may be the case that when more moderate forms of affirmative action are
implemented, little or no stigmatization of African-Americans results.
In addition to the devaluing of beneficiaries’ qualifications, the advertisement of
an organizations’ affirmative action policy can have other stigmatization effects, as well.
For example, negative attitudes typically directed toward individual beneficiaries may
generalize to the target group as a whole. Maio and Esses (1998) found that ratings of an
immigrant group were less positive when it was stated that they would benefit from
affirmative action. Similarly, individuals may assume that members of a particular group
benefit from affirmative action when an organization is known to have an affirmative
action policy. Therefore, even when African-Americans are not explicitly stated to be
beneficiaries of affirmative action, their qualifications may be discounted if the
organization has a publicized affirmative action program (Garcia et al., 1981). This may
be especially likely when there are small numbers of African-Americans present in the
organization (Heilman & Blader, 2001).
Emotional reactions to beneficiaries
Based on the preceding research, it is clear that negative attitudes toward
affirmative action may lead to negative evaluations of beneficiaries’ qualifications.
Research in social psychology is very helpful in understanding why negative reactions to
beneficiaries may follow the implementation of affirmative action. Levine and Campbell
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(1972) suggest that when an out-group is perceived to threaten the economic power of an
in-group, attitudes toward the out-group will be more negative. Since affirmative action
often involves the allocation of jobs and, therefore, wealth, the policy may be viewed as a
threat to the economic power of whites. In addition, beneficiaries of the policy would
likely be viewed as members of an out-group since they are typically members of groups
that are underrepresented within an organization. As such, affective reactions to
beneficiaries of affirmative action are expected to be negative.
Similar to the research reviewed earlier regarding reactions to affirmative action
policies, several studies provide evidence that attitudes toward beneficiaries may be
influenced by the anticipated economic consequences of the policy. For example,
perceived threats to the economic power of whites have been found to be highly
correlated with ratings of African-Americans (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1975). The more
African-Americans were thought to endanger the economic power of whites, the more
negative whites’ attitudes toward African-Americans became. Applied to affirmative
action, since the policy may involve some form of preferential treatment, beneficiaries
may be perceived as threatening the economic power of the dominant group by
competing with them for jobs, promotions, or admission into colleges and universities.
When this is the case the interpersonal relationships between beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries may suffer.
Research on labeling effects suggests that the negative interpersonal reactions
experienced by beneficiaries of affirmative action are not solely based on nonbeneficiaries’ beliefs regarding the economic consequences associated with the policy.
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Labeling effects are a phenomena whereby the social group to which an individual
belongs, or appears to belong, influences perceivers’ judgments and evaluations of that
individual (Jussim, Nelson, Manis & Soffin, 1995). Applying a social label to a target
may often be related to subsequent bias. This bias prompts perceivers to interpret
ambiguous target behavior in ways that are consistent with their beliefs about the target
group (Jussim et al., 1995). This is particularly troublesome for beneficiaries of
affirmative action since the increased salience of social categories produced by the policy
are likely to result in stereotypical thinking and prejudiced attitudes (Heilman, 1996). A
study consistent with this view found that non-beneficiaries described African-Americans
labeled as affirmative action hires less favorably as colleagues than individuals who were
not hired under affirmative action (Heilman et al., 1992).
There is relatively little empirical research linking attitudes toward affirmative
action with emotional reactions to beneficiaries. Of the research that is available, most
examines willingness on the part of non-beneficiaries to interact with beneficiaries.
Nacoste (1994) asserts that non-beneficiaries bring their beliefs regarding affirmative
action into their interactions with non-beneficiaries. Therefore, when their beliefs
regarding affirmative action are associated with negative evaluations of the policy nonbeneficiaries are more likely to display behaviors consistent with a desire for social
distance from members of the target group. Past research suggests that this may be
especially true for informal social interactions between beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries (Nacoste, Holt, Fender & Lennon, 1992; Edwards, Taylor, Switzer & Britt,
2004).
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Nacoste further speculates that beliefs regarding beneficiaries’ qualifications,
which stem from beliefs about the policy, may also influence interactions between nonbeneficiaries and beneficiaries. Based on these beliefs, non-beneficiaries may exhibit
behaviors like social neutrality, low-level hostility, or condescension when interacting
with beneficiaries. Results from a study conducted by Heilman and colleagues (1996)
support this assertion. Non-beneficiaries exposed to beneficiaries of preferential
treatment exhibited greater reluctance to engage in organizational citizenship behaviors.
In addition, non-beneficiaries’ perceptions that they were as or more deserving than the
preferentially selected beneficiary were associated with negative affect directed toward
target group members. Similar to beliefs regarding affirmative action, beliefs regarding
beneficiaries’ qualifications may also result in social isolation on the part of beneficiaries
since negative affect has been found to be related with an unwillingness to engage in
intergroup contact (Esses & Dovidio, 2002).
The research reviewed suggests that the stigma associated with being selected
under preferential treatment may have severe social consequences for beneficiaries.
Attitudes toward beneficiaries may be negative as a result of the economic costs of the
policy, in terms of jobs, promotions, and university admission, for non-beneficiaries.
Moreover, simply labeling African-Americans as affirmative action beneficiaries may
subject them to prejudice and negative stereotypes.
African-Americans may also experience social isolation when non- beneficiaries’
evaluate the policy negatively. The stigma associated with non-beneficiaries’ negative
beliefs regarding beneficiaries’ qualifications have been linked with greater disliking
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(Crocker, Major & Steele, 1998), reluctance to engage in helping behaviors, and social
isolation.
The previous review demonstrates that while most Americans endorse principles
like equality of opportunity and non-discrimination, redistributive policies like
affirmative action are often met with great opposition (Kinder & Sanders, 1996). Several
states, including California and Florida, have passed initiatives to end affirmative action
in all state-funded operations. In addition, the national debate over the need for, and
fairness of the policy, as well as the quality of its beneficiaries has had balkanizing
effects on society. The research reviewed thus far suggests that demographic
characteristics of the evaluator and attitudinal factors such as self-interest and perceived
threat from the policies are a significant influence on reactions to affirmative action
policies and beneficiaries. While this early theoretical work is helpful in understanding
the attitudinal predictors of reactions to both policies and beneficiaries, a more integrative
approach is needed. Social dominance theory provides a solid theoretical foundation for
understanding how the belief systems of the evaluator may lead to more positive or
negative reactions to the policy and beneficiaries.
Social Dominance Theory
Social dominance theory (SDT) provides a valuable framework for understanding
the dissimilarity between racial groups in terms of attitudes toward affirmative action.
This theory is particularly relevant to race-based affirmative action since it allows one to
make predictions regarding support or opposition to policies that benefit groups other
than one’s own. While SDT integrates a number of components of both classical and
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contemporary theories of social attitudes and intergroup relations it overcomes the
limitations of previous theories by recognizing the existence of social inequality as a key
contributor to social attitudes and relationships between social groups.
Social dominance theory suggests that whites’ opposition to affirmative action
stems from a desire to maintain their dominant status which results in competition
between blacks and whites for material and symbolic resources (Sidanius & Pratto,
1999). Since educational achievement tends to result in greater access to these resources
(i.e., wealth), the findings that opposition to the policy is greatest when applied in
educational settings (Schuman et al., 1997) and when it targets African-Americans
(Kravitz & Platania, 1993) appear to be consistent with the theory.
Therefore, SDT is particularly useful in understanding how individuals decide
whether policies intended to restore equality to groups other than one’s own are
justifiable or desirable. In addition, SDT extends these previous models by accounting
not only for individual-level motivations, but also the structural and institutional
dynamics that influence social policy attitudes and intergroup relations (Pratto, Sidanius,
Stallworth & Malle, 1994). Thus, SDT provides a comprehensive framework in which to
view attitudes toward affirmative action and reactions to beneficiaries of the policies as a
function of relationships between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
Social dominance theory is based on three major premises, and several predictions
can be drawn from social dominance theory with regard to affirmative action. The first
premise of the theory suggests that attitudes toward the policy are influenced by the
relative position of one’s social group in the social hierarchy. As such, members of
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subordinate groups are expected to be more supportive of the policy while dominant
group members are expected to express greater opposition to the policy. Based on
reviews of statistics regarding socioeconomic indicators, access to education and health
care, occupational status, and many others it is clear that in American society and,
particularly in most educational settings, the majority group and the most powerful group
is White males. Thus, meeting the conditions of the first premise requires a review of the
relative status of African-Americans.
The second premise of the theory emphasizes competition for resources among
dominant and subordinate groups. Dominant group members’ opposition to affirmative
action results from competition with subordinate groups over material resources. In this
case, whites’ resistance to the policy may be based on a desire to maintain the current
social asymmetry. The theory also suggests that one may find substantial differences
among majority group members’ attitudes toward the policy as a function of the
individual difference variable, social dominance orientation. This orientation represents
the extent to which dominant group members are motivated to maintain social inequality
and, consequently, their position of status and power.
The final premise of SDT is that socially acceptable legitimizing myths are used
to justify policy positions that serve to maintain the status quo, or the superiority of one
group over another. This premise would suggest that beliefs about the need for
affirmative action policies and dispositional characteristics of dominant group members
should influence resistance to the policy. In the present research, a variable related with
beliefs about the need for affirmative action, perceptions of race-based inequities, are
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examined with regard to attitudes toward a soft form of preferential treatment. The effect
of the individual difference variable, openness to diversity, on attitudes toward
beneficiaries of affirmative action will also be explored.
Premise One: Social Position of African-Americans and Whites
The research reviewed in this segment is important in meeting the first premise of
SDT; that African Americans are often a less dominant and powerful group in society.
While demographic predictors will not be a major focus of the current study, use of SDT
requires the researcher to establish that the group under investigation is indeed
disadvantaged. This segment is intended to provide support for the idea that African
Americans are in a less powerful and high status position than Caucasians.
Again, the first premise suggests that human societies tend to be organized as
systems of group-based social hierarchies. Group-based social hierarchies are social
systems in which the social power, prestige, and privilege that individuals enjoy are
obtained by virtue of their membership in a particular social group (Sidanius & Pratto,
1999). In contrast, individual-based social hierarchies are those in which individuals who
enjoy great power, prestige, or wealth do so by virtue of their own highly-valued
individual characteristics. Examples of such characteristics include high intelligence,
leadership ability or athletic achievement. However, due to the complex nature of human
social systems, individual- and group-based social hierarchies are not completely
independent of one another. Therefore, access to the means of individual achievement,
such as education, is often determined by membership in ascribed social groups.
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Hierarchical social structures are made up of one or a small number of dominant
groups at the top and one or a number of subordinate groups at the bottom. Due to
predominant influence of the dominant group over subordinate groups, the dominant
group is typically distinguished by its possession of a disproportionately large share of
positive social value. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) define positive social value as “all those
material and symbolic things for which people strive.” Examples of positive social value
include high social status, power, political authority, and wealth. In contrast, subordinate
groups possess a disproportionately large share of negative social value. As a result, they
are characterized by a lack of wealth and power, high risk and low-status occupations,
and low social status. It is this unequal distribution of social value to various groups
within the social hierarchy that often directly produces group-based inequality.
In the United States the most salient social groups with the greatest power
differential are based on race. Historically, whites have been the dominant group in
America with all other groups being measured in terms of their standards and values
(Wilson & Martin, 1982). African-Americans, on the other hand, have typically been a
subordinate group occupying the lowest position on the social status continuum.
Research indicates that there is a high level of agreement across ethnic groups on the
relative social status of whites and blacks in America (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Thus,
blacks as well as whites acknowledge a status differential between groups.
In addition to having relatively low social status, African-Americans also possess
a disproportionately large share of many other indicators of negative social value. One
indicator of negative social value is group overrepresentation in low-status occupations.
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While African-Americans are employed at only 40% the rate of Whites in managerial,
professional, and sales occupations they are employed at almost twice the rate of whites
in private household, service and laborer occupations (Bigler, Averhart & Liben, 2003).
Social groups possessing a large share of negative social value are also
characterized by lack of wealth. A recent report based on Census data indicates that there
continues to be a considerable disparity between African-Americans and whites in terms
of wealth (Muhammad, Davis, Liu & Leondar-Wright, 2004). For example, in 2001,
African-Americans earned only $0.57 for every $1.00 of income earned by Whites. In
addition, based on current income levels the average African-American college graduate
will earn $500,000 less in their lifetime than the average white college graduate. Finally,
in 2001 the average net worth for black families was $19,000 compared with $121,000
for white families. These striking disparities along with African-Americans’ relatively
low social status reveal that blacks remain disadvantaged and, according to SDT’s
characterization, a subordinate group.
While the first premise provides the foundation for understanding potential
differences as a function of demographic factors, the purpose of the present study is to
develop predictors of resistance to affirmative action policies and beneficiaries based on
the remaining two premises. Thus, these premises will be explored in more detail.
Premise Two: Dominant Groups and Competition for Resources
The second premise of SDT suggests that politics is based on competition
between social groups over scarce material and symbolic resources, such as wealth and
high social status, and core values and belief systems (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Based
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on this premise, individuals who desire inequitable relationships between different social
groups should attempt to use politics as a tool to gain or maintain a dominant position
over others. As a result, group-based dominance motives should be reflected in attitudes
toward various social policies.
Of particular interest are redistributive policies which involve the allocation of
resources. While individuals vary in terms of the extent to which they desire hegemonic
relationships between groups, overall, members of dominant groups are expected to
possess higher levels of group-based dominance motives. This seems reasonable since,
as members of the dominant group, maintaining the status quo yields favorable results.
Therefore, as a general rule, members of dominant groups should be less supportive of
social policies intended to redress group-based inequality. This is not meant to imply that
substantial variability in levels of support for social policies does not exist among
dominant group members, but that, overall, one could expect that dominant groups would
be less supportive of such policies than subordinate groups.
Applied to the policy of affirmative action, SDT predicts that whites would be
less supportive of the policy than African-Americans. Indeed, past research has
consistently provided support for this prediction. Affirmative action policies of all types
receive less support from Whites than African-Americans (Bobo & Smith, 1994; Kinder
& Sanders, 1990; Kravitz & Platania, 1993; Sigelman & Welch, 1991). According to
SDT, this is likely due to the policy being a means for encouraging upward mobility and,
thus, social equality for African-Americans. In addition, numerous findings that among
whites, attitudes toward affirmative action are most negative when the policy targets
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African-Americans appear to underscore this point (Clayton, 1992; Kravitz & Platania,
1993; Murrell et al., 1994; Sniderman et al., 1991). Viewed within a SDT framework,
whites’ opposition to race-based affirmative action appears to reflect, at least in part, a
desire to maintain their dominant social status.
The social dominance model also has implications for dominant group members’
attitudes toward beneficiaries of affirmative action. Research indicates that negative
attitudes toward affirmative action often “spill-over” onto beneficiaries of the policy
(Nacoste, 1992). Therefore, affirmative action beneficiaries are often perceived by nonbeneficiaries as less qualified and depicted less favorably as coworkers (Garcia et al.,
1981; Heilman et al., 1992). However, there is very little information available on the
forces driving these spill-over effects. Social dominance theory suggests that negative
attitudes directed toward beneficiaries of affirmative action may result from dominant
group members’ perceptions that these individuals pose a threat to the current social
hierarchy. Since whites are predicted to exhibit a greater preference for hierarchical
social relationships and, therefore, more negative attitudes toward policies that promote
social equality it seems logical that whites’ attitudes toward those who benefit from these
policies would be negative as well.
Again, this does not suggest that all dominant group members are unable to
empathize with members of subordinate groups or to adopt a more egalitarian perspective
when evaluating affirmative action. In fact, individuals within the dominant group are
expected to vary in the extent to which they prefer hierarchical relationships between
their particular social group and minority groups. Social dominance orientation (SDO) as
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an individual difference variable allows one to more fully understand variability in
attitudes toward social policies that exists among dominant group members. Given this,
social dominance orientation may be a valuable predictor in understanding reaction to
affirmative action policies and beneficiaries, and will be explored in more detail.
Social dominance orientation
Social dominance orientation is an individual difference variable reflecting a
generalized tendency to desire the predominance of one social group over another (Pratto
et al., 1994). Depending upon the particular society, these social groups may be defined
in a number of ways including race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or
class. Regardless of how the social groups are constructed, individuals exhibiting lower
levels of social dominance orientation are expected to be more supportive of social
policies that promote social equality while those with high levels of social dominance
orientation are expected to be more supportive of policies that maximize the power
differential between groups. This is particularly true when policies target those social
groups that are the most prominent and that characterize the most severe power disparity
in the society at a given time (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Thus, social dominance
orientation functions as the means by which group-based hierarchies reproduce and
reinforce themselves.
Social dominance theorists posit that one of the primary ways individuals acquire
various levels of social dominance orientation is through socialization experiences. In
general, members of dominant social groups are typically treated better than members of
subordinate groups. As a result, these individuals tend to be more comfortable with
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social inequality. In addition, social value is allocated in ways that benefit individuals in
dominant groups thereby creating the impression that these groups are better than others.
This, in effect, legitimizes inequality in many dominants’ minds. Therefore, members of
dominant groups are expected to adopt higher levels of social dominance orientation than
members of subordinate groups. Consistent findings that men and Whites tend to be
higher in social dominance orientation than women and African-Americans, respectively,
are consistent with this statement (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto & Mitchell,
1994; Whitley, 1999).
Recent measures of social dominance orientation adopt a multidimensional
conceptualization which consists of two related factors: opposition to equality and
support for group-based dominance (Jost & Thompson, 2000). Again, the perspective of
SDT is that one would expect to find group level differences in support of affirmative
action since subordinate groups are expected to be more supportive than dominant
groups, as demonstrated in the research reviewed earlier. However, it is also the case that
one can find substantial within group variability as a function of social dominance
orientation.
Perhaps the most important consequence of social dominance orientation is its
influence on attitudes toward various social policies that influence intergroup relations.
Pratto and colleagues (1994) found social dominance orientation to be associated with
opposition to several policies intended to attenuate social inequality. For example,
individuals exhibiting high levels of social dominance orientation had less positive
attitudes toward various policies involving universal healthcare, low income housing, and
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employment as indicated by correlations ranging from -.29 to -.70 across six samples.
Similarly, correlations between -.39 and -.72 across seven samples demonstrate that those
scoring high on a measure of social dominance orientation were less likely to endorse
statements promoting the equal distribution of wealth between the rich and the poor.
Negative relationships between social dominance orientation and support for policies
promoting women’s rights were also obtained across six samples. These findings suggest
that the higher an individual’s social dominance orientation, the more likely that
individual is to oppose policies designed to benefit members of disadvantaged groups.
Since whites are presumed to define their group’s social position relative to the position
of the subordinate group (Bobo, 2000), it is expected that those who perceive gains made
by African-Americans as undermining their economic opportunities would be
significantly more opposed to government interventions designed to help AfricanAmericans.
Social dominance orientation has also been found to influence attitudes toward
affirmative action. Higher levels of social dominance orientation tend to be associated
with more negative attitudes toward affirmative action policies involving racial quotas,
higher education, and explicit government intervention (Pratto et al., 1994). Since an
important aspect of social dominance orientation is general opposition to equality it
seems reasonable that those high in social dominance orientation would most oppose
social policies which favor low-status groups and, effectively, attenuate social inequality.
Jost and Thompson’s (2000) finding that opposition to equality is associated with
resistance to affirmative action lends support to this assertion. It is important to note that
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a preference for social inequality is based on a desire to maintain one’s dominant position
in the social hierarchy. Given that the social dominance of one group over another results
from disproportionate allocation of positive social value within the social hierarchy
opposition to affirmative action should also be associated with perceived threats to the
dominant group’s material and symbolic resources. In support of this claim, there is
evidence that individuals who perceive affirmative action as threatening to the in-group’s
economic and political power or their beliefs and values were most likely to oppose the
policy (Renfro et al., 2006).
Social dominance orientation should also be associated with an individual’s
attitudes toward various social groups. Individuals who are high in social dominance
orientation are expected to prefer members of high-status groups and discriminate against
members of stigmatized out-groups. These effects may be exacerbated when out-group
members are perceived to threaten the economic welfare or political power of the ingroup (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Since affirmative action policies are often viewed as a
form of reverse discrimination, it is reasonable to assume that many also perceive the
policy as threatening majority group members’ capacity to obtain jobs, promotions, and
access to higher education (Renfro et al., 2006). Therefore, those who perceive that their
economic power and, consequently, their dominant social position are threatened by the
policy may hold negative attitudes toward the beneficiaries of the policy.
Premise Three: Legitimizing Myths
The third premise of SDT suggests that group-based social inequality is sustained
by legitimizing myths. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) define legitimizing myths as
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ideological instruments, including attitudes, values, beliefs, and stereotypes that provide
moral or intellectual justification for the social practices that distribute social value within
the social system. These instruments are used to convince both dominants and
subordinates of the fairness of hierarchically organized social relations. Moreover, they
provide rationales for differences between groups with regard to value and deservingness.
As a result, legitimizing myths can function to either increase, maintain, or decrease the
level of social inequality that exists between social groups. As such, these ideologies
mediate the relationship between social dominance orientation and the relevant practices
and policies that distribute social value within the hierarchy.
Given this premise, SDT suggests that legitimizing myths serve as a means by
which dominance motives help influence attitudes toward affirmative action. In the
present study, we examine the possibility that belief systems regarding the existence of
race-based inequities and the value of diversity mediate the effects of social dominance
orientation. Specifically, when these belief systems involve denying the existence of
racial inequities or the value of diversity, attitudes toward the policy and beneficiaries are
anticipated to be more negative (Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan & Martin, 2005).
Those ideologies that justify and support hierarchical social structures and,
thereby, social inequality are referred to as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths.
Hierarchy-enhancing ideologies serve to reinforce and exacerbate group-based
differences. Individuals who endorse this type of ideology tend to support hierarchical
social relationships. For example, many of the views that constitute political
conservatism are hierarchy-enhancing ideologies that reinforce social inequality through

40

the belief that each individual has earned and, therefore, deserves the position along the
social status continuum that they occupy.
A hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth often used to justify opposition to
affirmative action is the belief that group-based discrimination is no longer prevalent and,
therefore, equal opportunity exists (Edwards, Taylor, Switzer & Britt, 2004). This type
of ideology is problematic for two reasons. First, the belief that equal opportunity exists
for everyone minimizes the many long-standing group-based disparities that continue to
exist. In addition, acceptance of this ideology ignores the source of the disparities
between social groups, effectively making them impossible to rectify. Endorsement of
this myth is likely to be more prevalent among Whites since, as members of the dominant
social group, they are unlikely to have experienced discrimination. Moreover, despite the
various laws and statutes that have sought to integrate society, most Whites still have
relatively little contact with African-Americans (Smith et al., 1997). Therefore, they
would also be expected to have little understanding or knowledge of the discrimination
committed against members of this group.
In the context of affirmative action, beliefs regarding the existing opportunity
structure for African-Americans are an important legitimizing myth. If one adopts the
hierarchy-attenuating belief that there are unfair discrepancies in existing opportunities
for African-Americans, then policies would be justified. However, if one adopts the
hierarchy-enhancing view that opportunities are equal or that any discrepancies are
justifiable, then affirmative action would not be justified. Thus, SDT suggests that
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beliefs regarding existing opportunity structures may be an important predictor of
reactions to these policies and beneficiaries.
A second belief system that is relevant to affirmative action concerns perceived
detrimental or beneficial effects of diversity. If one holds the hierarchy-attenuating belief
that diversity is positive, support of affirmative action may follow. In contrast, those who
believe diversity has little or no value would not be expected to support the policy. In the
next segments, we explore these two factors stemming from the third premise of SDT
that may predict support or opposition to affirmative action.
In summary, social dominance orientation is expected to predict reactions to
affirmative action policies and beneficiaries in educational settings. However, this
relationship is believed to be mediated by two legitimizing beliefs: that race-based
inequities do not exist, and that diversity is not valuable in education.
Perceptions of race-based inequities: A core legitimizing belief
Affirmative action policies were initially adopted by institutions of higher
education to redress many of the group-based disparities resulting from years of
discrimination against African-Americans and other minorities. Despite recent Supreme
Court rulings upholding some forms of affirmative action in higher education, the policy
has not received widespread public support. In fact, societal reactions to the policy
appear to have become more negative in recent years. This may be, at least in part, due
to many non-beneficiaries’ belief that affirmative action amounts to reverse
discrimination. If this is the case, then it seems logical to expect that certain group-level
trends in college and university enrollment rates would be evident. Mainly, these trends

42

should show that African-Americans have made greater gains in access to higher
education than whites over the period of affirmative action. Moreover, as a result of
greater gains relative to those of whites, one would also expect the disparity between the
two groups to be greatly diminished.
Unfortunately, it has not been the case that the disparity between AfricanAmericans and Whites in terms of access to higher education has diminished. To the
contrary, many of the statistics used as indicators of equal access to higher education
show that the disparities between the two groups have actually increased since 1974. For
instance, in 2005 the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) reported that the
participation rate in 1974 for whites and African-Americans were 38% and 26%,
respectively. This indicates a disparity between the two groups, in terms of participation
in higher education, of 12 percentage points. The NCES defines participation rate as the
proportion of 18 to 24 year olds who are enrolled in or have completed postsecondary
education. While both groups experienced large gains in participation rates between
1974 and 2003, gains in participation rates for African-Americans relative to those for
whites actually decreased during this time. Therefore, by 2003 whites continued to have
higher participation rates in higher education than African-Americans. In addition, the
increase in participation for whites outpaced that of African-Americans by 15 percentage
points. Thus, the disparity between whites and African-Americans combined
postsecondary enrollment and completion rates increased from 12% to 15% between
1974 and 2003.
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It is important to note that the disparity between whites and African-Americans’
participation rates is not based on failure to graduate from high school. The gap between
the two groups was largely erased between 1970 and 2000 (Renner & Moore, 2004). In
1970, slightly over 50% of whites over the age of twenty-five had completed high school
compared with about 30% of African-Americans. By 2000, 85% of whites over twentyfive and about 80% of African-Americans over twenty-five had completed high school.
Therefore, it seems logical that the improvement in high school graduation rates for
African-Americans should have led to relatively greater gains in college participation
rates when compared with their white counterparts. However, despite the presumed
advantages provided to minorities by affirmative action, African-Americans have not
taken part in the huge growth in access to higher education at the same rate as whites.
The preceding statistics demonstrate that even with affirmative action in place,
substantial disparities still exist between whites and African-Americans in terms of
access to higher education. Despite having almost equivalent graduation rates, AfricanAmericans’ postsecondary participation rates continue to lag behind those of whites by a
significant margin. This being the case, it is difficult to explain why many whites oppose
affirmative action in higher education. Several studies show that affirmative action
receives greater support from those who believe the policy enhances opportunities to
achieve equal treatment of groups (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Bobo & Smith, 1994;
Harrison et al., 2006; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997). Therefore, it seems reasonable that
acknowledgement of the enduring disparities that exist in higher education should lead to
more positive attitudes toward affirmative action.
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However, simple acknowledgement of these disparities may not be enough to
increase support for affirmative action. In order to influence reactions to the policy, it
may be necessary for the racial differences to first be perceived as inequities. The term
inequity implies that the racial differences in access to higher education are unjust or
unfairly biased. Thus, perceptions of race-based inequities are likely to be influenced by
the degree to which African-Americans are believed to have equal opportunity in terms
of access to higher education. Although perceptions of race-based inequities have not
been empirically examined, there is a substantial amount of literature linking beliefs
regarding the existence of equal opportunity for African-Americans and attitudes toward
affirmative action.
While studies utilizing social dominance theory are limited, research on relevant
components of the theory lend support to the idea that beliefs about racial equity are
critical in determining endorsement of affirmative action. Findings from numerous
studies indicate that beliefs regarding the existence of equal opportunity predict these
reactions. A variety of theoretical perspectives directly related these beliefs to support of
the policies. For example, several researchers have analyzed perceptions of inequitable
opportunities in terms of relative deprivation theory (Beaton & Deveau, 2005; Tougas &
Veilleux, 1990; Veilleux & Tougas, 1989). Relative deprivation on behalf of others is a
specific form of collective relative deprivation involving perceived social inequalities
between one’s more fortunate in-group and members of an underprivileged out-group.
This form of collective relative deprivation takes into account the level of dissatisfaction
generated by the discrepancy between the two groups. Overall, these studies suggest that
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perceptions of inequitable opportunities with regard to a disadvantaged group, and the
resulting feelings of discontent, were associated with increased endorsement of
affirmative action. Thus, relative deprivation theory provides evidence suggesting that
perceptions of group-based inequities should predict reactions to affirmative action.
Kluegel and Smith (1983) examined beliefs regarding equal opportunity for
African-Americans in terms of stratification beliefs. Stratification beliefs are ideas about
how one achieves high status. The authors speculated that beliefs that the stratification
system does not provide equal opportunity for everyone would lead to endorsement of
affirmative action as a way to equalize opportunities for African-Americans. Their
results indicated that perceived equality of opportunity predicted attitudes toward several
types of affirmative action policies. Specifically, whites who perceived that AfricanAmericans have inequitable opportunities had more favorable attitudes toward programs
intended to help African-Americans get ahead. These individuals were also more
supportive of set-asides in college and university admissions to admit qualified AfricanAmericans. These individuals also had more favorable attitudes toward set-asides in
employment for qualified candidates.
Research examining another closely related belief system, belief in the existence
of White privilege, may also be relevant to attitudes toward affirmative action. According
to Neville, Worthington and Spanierman (2001), White privilege is a system of unearned
social advantages afforded to Whites that is based primarily on race rather than merit.
Findings from several studies suggest that individuals who display stronger beliefs in the
existence of White privilege tend to be more supportive of affirmative action policies,
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particularly those that aim to compensate African-Americans for past discrimination
(Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003; Swim & Miller, 1999). Moreover, Powell and colleagues
(2005) posit that, for Whites, acknowledgement of the illegitimate privileges they receive
is often associated with negative psychological consequences, or White guilt.
Differences in levels of White guilt have been found to influence policy attitudes.
For instance, in a study conducted by Bardis (1972), higher White guilt scores were
associated with greater willingness to admit African-Americans to colleges. Similarly,
relationships have also been found between feelings of White guilt and attitudes toward
both affirmative action, in general, and compensatory affirmative action (Iyer et al., 2003;
Swim & Miller, 1999). In addition, White guilt was also found to mediate the
relationship between belief in the existence of White privilege and reactions to
affirmative action. In other words, acknowledgement of unfair advantages afforded to
Whites based solely on race is associated with greater feelings of guilt and, as a result,
greater support for affirmative action policies.
Taken together, findings from studies of relative deprivation theory, white
privilege and guilt, and stratification beliefs appear to have strong implications for the
relationship between perceptions of race-based inequities and attitudes toward affirmative
action. These findings suggest that perceptions of race-based inequities should reliably
predict attitudes toward affirmative action. Specifically, those who perceive greater
illegitimate inequities between African-Americans and Whites in terms of access to
higher education are expected to express greater support for the policy (Klugel & Smith,
1983).
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Attitudes toward diversity: A second legitimizing belief
A second factor related to the notion of legitimizing myths deals with beliefs
regarding diversity. Diversity has a long-standing history as a rationale for affirmative
action in higher education. The policy was initially adopted by institutions of higher
education in order to increase the numbers of African-Americans and other
underrepresented minorities on college and university campuses. In addition, the
Supreme Court decision in the 1978 Bakke case established diversity as a compelling
reason for affirmative action in college admissions. Moreover, the diversity argument
was recently reinforced by the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger.
Thus, affirmative action continues to be a legal means to the end of achieving racial and
ethnic diversity in higher education.
Much of the argument for diversity as a rationale for affirmative action is based
on the premise that diversity is beneficial to the academic development of students.
While the results are not unequivocal, a growing body of literature provides support for
this assertion. Diversity has been found to be related to several positive outcomes like
greater retention for minority students (Bowen & Bok, 1998; Chang, 1999), and
enhanced complex thinking (Antonio et al., 2004), and greater growth in intellectual
motivation and academic skills among majority students (Gurin, Dey, Hurtado & Gurin,
2002). Moreover, students in diverse classroom environments have also been found to
display increased gains in problem-solving and group skills (Terenzini, Cabrera, Colbeck,
Bjorklund & Parente, 2001). Specifically, students in ethnically diverse workgroups over
an extended period of time have been found to integrate multiple perspectives (Watson,
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Kumar & Michaelsen, 1993) and produce a higher quality (McLeod, Lobel & Cox, 1996)
of ideas compared with students in ethnically homogeneous groups. These findings
suggest that both majority and minority students reap significant benefits by
matriculating at racially and ethnically diverse institutions.
Despite empirical work suggesting that diversity can be beneficial, there is
evidence that increased diversity on college campuses may have detrimental effects, as
well. For example, minority students often experience racially motivated harassment and
hostility at much greater rates than their white peers (Ehrlich, 1992; Rankin & Reason,
2005). According to Ehrlich, such incidents may occur because white college students
often view classmates from different backgrounds as competitors rather than partners
(Levin & McDevitt, 1995).
Some individuals may react in negative ways to diversity by fearing those who
are different or expressing prejudicial attitudes (De Meuse & Hostager, 2001). Fear of
minority students may have adverse consequences for classroom interactions. For
example, Barak and Cherin (1998) suggest that minority students are more likely to
experience lower work group involvement due to being excluded from important
informational networks. Similary, greater demographic heterogeneity has also been
found to result in lower cooperation within group contexts (Chatman & Flynn, 2001).
Finally, increased group relationship conflict may result when visible differences
between group members are prominent (Randel, 2002). Therefore, it is important to
identify factors that influence individuals’ attitudes toward those who are different.
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Clearly, some individuals may be more threatened by differences associated with
diversity while others embrace them. When individuals react positively to diversity,
beneficial outcomes, like better problem-solving skills and increased collaboration, are
likely to result. In contrast, negative outcomes, like increased conflict and lower
cooperation, may result when diversity is not accepted and appreciated. Therefore,
understanding individual differences in attitudes toward those who are different may be
useful for predicting various outcomes associated with diversity.
The openness to diversity construct integrates aspects of both early and recent
definitions of diversity (Pascarella et al., 1994; Pascarella, Edison, Nora, Hagedorn &
Terenzini, 1996). Pascarella and colleagues’ notion of diversity includes value
differences, in addition to differences in surface and deeper level demographic
characteristics. Their approach to defining diversity is particularly relevant to the present
study since it was developed for use in the context of higher education. In addition, this
variable specifically addresses individuals’ willingness to interact with those who are
different which, as the previously reviewed research demonstrates, can be a major issue
for beneficiaries of affirmative action (Flynn, 2005; Thompson et al., 2002).
Overview of the Current Study and Hypotheses
In the present study, social dominance theory will be used as a framework for
selecting and developing predictors of reactions to affirmative action policies and
beneficiaries. Based on the premises of SDT, we test predictions regarding the effect of
social dominance orientation on attitudes toward a “soft” preferential treatment policy in
the context of higher education. With this type of admissions policy, an African-
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American applicant is granted admission over a White applicant when they are equally
qualified. The mediating effects of two legitimizing ideologies, perceptions of racebased inequities and attitudes toward diversity, are also examined. (See Appendix A).
We also test predictions regarding the influence of social dominance on attitudes
toward affirmative action beneficiaries. Consistent with prior research on attitudes, we
include three dimensions of reactions to beneficiaries in the current study: emotional
reactions to beneficiaries, willingness to work and socialize with beneficiaries, and
perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities. (See Appendix A).
Based on research regarding the demographic characteristics of evaluators, we
propose that:
H1: Women's attitudes toward affirmative action will be significantly more
positive than those of Caucasian males. In addition, SDO, perceptions of
inequities and attitudes toward diversity will serve as partial mediators of this
relationship.
Since it is unlikely that there will be a sufficient number of African-Americans present in
the sample, we did not analyze data as a function of respondent race. As a result, racebased differences in reactions to affirmative action were not examined in the present
study.
Based on research regarding the effects of social dominance orientation, beliefs
regarding racial inequities and the value of diversity (cf: Sidanius & Pratto, 1999;
Aberson & Haag,2003), we propose that:
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Hypothesis 2: The relationship between social dominance orientation and “soft”
preferential treatment will be significant and negative. Those higher in SDO will
have more negative views of the policies.
Hypothesis H2a: This relationship will be partially mediated by perceptions of
race-based inequities.
Hypothesis 2b: This relationship will be partially mediated by beliefs regarding
the value of diversity.
Based on the findings regarding spillover effects, we expected that:
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between social dominance orientation and
attitudes toward beneficiaries will be significant and negative. Those higher in
SDO will have more negative views of the beneficiaries.
Hypothesis 3a: The relationship between social dominance orientation and
affective reactions to African-American affirmative action beneficiaries,
willingness to socialize with beneficiaries, and beliefs about beneficiary abilities
will be partially mediated by attitudes toward diversity and perceptions of racebased inequities.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHODS

Participants
Two hundred fifty-two students (224 Whites, 21 African-Americans, and 7
unknown) enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Clemson University
participated in the study. Forty-one percent, or 103, of the participants were female and
fifty-nine percent, or 148, were male. The participants were informed that they were
participating in a dissertation study conducted by a graduate student and that they would
receive course credit for their participation after attending a debriefing session. In
addition, the participants were informed that their participation was voluntary and their
responses would be kept confidential.
Measures
Predictors
Demographic Variables. Gender was assessed since findings from several
streams of research indicated that sex characteristics have strong relationships with social
dominance orientation, attitudes toward diversity and attitudes toward affirmative action.
Participant gender was coded as a dummy variable where 0 = male and 1 = female.
Social Dominance Orientation. (see Appendix B) The social dominance scale,
developed by Pratto and colleagues (1994) assesses the degree to which individuals
prefer group-based social inequality. The measure consists of 16 items scored on a 7point likert-type scale. Higher scores on the measure reflect lower levels of the
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orientation. Over several studies, the measure has been found to have acceptable
reliability with a test-retest reliability of .86 and an equivalent forms reliability of .75. A
sample item is, “We should strive for increased social equality between groups”.
Perceptions of Race-Based Inequities. (see Appendix B) The perceived
inequities scale is a modified version of the perceived workforce inequities scale that
assesses the degree to which respondents perceive disparities in access to higher
education between African-Americans and Whites. The items were chosen to be
consistent with previous measures of the racial inequalities construct. The scale consists
of nine items scored on a 7-point likert-type scale. Higher scores indicate greater
endorsement of the items with response categories ranging from strongly disagree to
strongly agree. Example items include, “Fewer African-Americans than Whites have
college degrees” and “Few African-Americans attend prestigious colleges and
universities.”
Attitudes Toward Diversity. (see Appendix B) This scale measures the degree to
which individuals appreciate and value racial and ethnic diversity. The measure consists
of eight items scored on a 7-point likert-type scale. Two of the items are taken from the
Openness to Diversity scale developed by Pascarella and colleagues (1994; 1996). These
items include, “Learning about people from different cultures is a very important part of
my college education” and “Contact with individuals whose background is different from
my own is an essential part of my education.” One item is from a modified version of the
Openness to Diversity used by Ervin (2001). This item states, “Cross-racial friendships
are difficult because of peer pressure.” The remaining five items were developed by the
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author based on prior studies conducted by De Meuse and Hostager (2001) and Hobman
et al. (2004).
Dependent Measures
Attitudes Toward “Soft” Preferential Treatment. (see Appendix B) Attitudes
toward affirmative action measures the degree to which students support affirmative
action in college and university admissions. This scale consists of eight items rated on a
7-point likert-type scale with higher scores indicating greater support for the policy.
Seven of the items were taken from a scale used in a study by Richardson (2005) and
have been modified to increase their relevance to the particular context. An example of
the items in the scale includes, “I support the use of affirmative action in college and
university admissions”. The remaining item was developed by Sidanius et al. (2004).
This item states, “Affirmative action admits too many students who have a low chance of
academic success”. Higher scores indicate greater support for “soft” preferential
treatment policies.
Perceptions of Beneficiary Abilities. (see Appendix B) Perceptions of
beneficiary abilities measures respondent beliefs regarding the academic competency of
affirmative action beneficiaries. The scale consists of 12 items scored on a 7-point likerttype scale. Three of the items are taken from studies conducted by Heilman and
colleagues (1992, 1998) that have been modified to be applicable in an educational
setting. One item asks, “How competently do you expect this individual to perform in
class?” Responses to this item range from 1, for not at all competently, to 7, for very
competently. The remaining six items were developed by the author and have been
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modified to be relevant in an educational setting. An example of these items is, “How
likely would you be to seek help on an assignment from this individual?” Responses
range from 1, for not at all likely, to 7, for very likely.
Affective Reactions to Beneficiaries. (see Appendix B) The affective reactions to
beneficiaries scale is intended to measure attitudes toward members of outgroups. The
items, which reflect both positive and negative affect associated with beneficiaries of
affirmative action, are taken from a study conducted by Stephan and colleagues (1999).
Participants will be asked to indicate the degree to which they feel 12 different emotional
reactions when asked to interact with African-American students admitted to college
through affirmative action. Responses are on a 7-point scale ranging from 1, for none at
all, to 7, for extreme. The emotional reactions include hostility, disliking, superiority,
disdain, hatred, rejection, admiration, acceptance, affection, approval, sympathy, and
warmth. Higher scores on the measure reflect more positive attitudes toward
beneficiaries of affirmative action.
Willingness to Work and Socialize with Beneficiaries. (see Appendix B)
Participants’ willingness to work and socialize with beneficiaries of affirmative action is
assessed using a seven item scale used in a previous study (Edwards et al., 2004) and
developed by the author that has been modified to be applicable in the context of higher
education. A sample item is, “I would be interested in socializing with an individual
outside of class if I knew that they were admitted through affirmative action.” Responses
range from 1, for not at all, to 7, for very much. Items were developed with a range of
behaviors involving contact with and willingness to help African Americans.
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Procedure
Participants accessed the measures via the departmental subject pool website. In
the first stage of the online survey, participants read a brief informed consent statement
describing the intentions of the study. This statement also informed participants that their
participation in the study was voluntary and their responses would be kept confidential.
Respondents were then provided with the instructions for the study and asked to indicate
their level of agreement with the items on the surveys. Following the instructions,
participants read a definition and description of a “soft” preferential treatment (see
Appendix A). After reading the description, respondents were asked to answer several
demographic questions before completing the measures. The presentation of the three
predictor measures, social dominance orientation, perceptions of race-based inequities,
and attitudes toward diversity were counterbalanced. Later, the participants attended
group debriefing sessions.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESULTS
Data Screening
Two hundred fifty-four participant responses were downloaded from the subject
pool website. The data was screened to ensure its appropriateness for structural equation
modeling. First, a missing data analysis was conducted using EQS 6.1. Less than one
percent, or 68 of the 19,908 cells were missing data. Cases with responses to fewer than
50% of the items were deleted. Based on this criteria one case, case #121, was deleted.
Descriptive statistics were computed for each indicator to ensure that there was an
adequate degree of variability in the responses. Means and standard deviations for the
indicators are presented in Appendix C. The data was not assessed for univariate outliers.
Instead, multivariate outliers were identified. The most widely used estimation methods
in structural equation modeling assume multivariate normality (Kline, 2005). Therefore,
the Mahalanobis distance was computed for each case. Cases with a Mahalanobis
distance greater than the established critical value are multivariate outliers. Based on the
Chi-square table, the critical value for seventy-nine degrees of freedom with a probability
value of .001 is 123.60. Nine cases had a Mahalanobis distance greater than the
established critical value. However, inspection of a histogram of the Mahalanobis
distance revealed only one case to be a multivariate outlier, case #133. Therefore, this
case was deleted. Finally, the missing data was imputed using expectation-maximization
(EM) imputation.
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Validation of the Measurement Model
The measurement model was validated using EQS for structural equation
modeling. Structural equation modeling is a statistical approach which incorporates both
path analysis and factor analysis. While it serves purposes similar to those of multiple
regression use of structural equation modeling has several advantages. For example, use
of structural equation modeling reduces measurement error by allowing multiple
indicators per latent variable whereas regression allows only one indicator per variable.
Moreover, structural equation modeling has the ability to model error terms, specifically
correlated error terms, while uncorrelated error terms are assumed in regression. Thus,
structural equation modeling represents a more powerful alternative to multiple
regression.
Another advantage of structural equation modeling is that it tests overall models
in addition to individual coefficients. Tests of the overall model are based on how
accurately the predicted model reproduces the pattern of variances and covariances
present in the data. To the extent that the model implied variances and covariances
reproduce the observed variances and covariances the model is accepted or rejected.
Although SEM has advantages over regression, it has important limitations as
well. It may be the case that models that provide a better fit to the data are inconsistent
with existing theory and driven by characteristics of a given dataset. Using a purely
empirical approach to determining the relationship of psychological variables to one
another may lead a researcher to be overconfident in the extent to which patterns of data
in a given dataset generalize to other datasets. In other words, decisions based on
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empirical estimates of model fit and adequacy of measures in a given dataset should be
balanced with a reference to theory and knowledge based on the existing literature.
Determination of whether to accept or reject the model is typically based on
interpretation of goodness of fit measures. However, examination of the literature
demonstrates that there is wide disagreement on which fit measures to report. For
instance, Jaccard and Wan (1996) recommend reporting fit indices from each of the
following categories: fit tests based on predicted versus observed covariances; fit tests
based on predicted versus observed covariances, but which penalize for lack of
parsimony; and, fit tests comparing the researcher’s model with plausible alternative
models. In contrast, Kline (2005) recommends use of at least four fit indices, such as chisquare; CFI; RMSEA; and SRMR.
In the present study the goodness of fit of the measurement model was assessed
using the Chi-square statistic, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) and the
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger & Lind, 1980). The chisquare statistic was selected because it is the most commonly reported fit index. Good
model fit is indicated by a non-significant chi-square value. However, results based on
this fit index may often be misleading. For example, because large sample sizes are more
likely to lead to rejection of the model, the chi-square statistic is associated with a greater
likelihood of Type II errors (finding an effect where none exists). Therefore, it is often
the case that with sample sizes in excess of 200 participants and good approximate fit as
indicated by other fit measures, the significance of the chi-square test is discounted.
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The comparative fit index, or CFI, compares the existing model with the
independence model which assumes the latent variables in the model are uncorrelated.
Based on this comparison the CFI gauges the percent of misfit which is accounted for by
going from the independence model to the predicted model. CFI values should be equal
to or greater than .90 to accept the model, indicating that the predicted model is 90%
better than the independence model (Bentler, 1992). Like the model chi-square, the Root
Mean Square Error of Approximation, or RMSEA, is based on the discrepancy between
the covariances in the predicted and observed models. However, the RMSEA penalizes
goodness of fit for a lack of parsimony. This is beneficial since, in general, a model with
fewer indicators per factor will have better fit than a model with more indicators per
factor. The RMSEA is reported in the present study because it adjusts for this tendency.
In addition, like the CFI, the RMSEA is less sensitive to sample size than other fit
measures (Fan, Thompson & Wang, 1999). According to Hu and Bentler (1999) good
model fit is indicated by RMSEA values of .06 or less.
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to assess the adequacy of the
measurement model. Based on research suggesting individuals’ reactions to affirmative
action policies often “spillover” onto beneficiaries three models were tested in order to
determine the factor structure of the scales assessing reactions to affirmative action
policies and beneficiaries. Each model was evaluated based on several criteria. The first
criterion is the dimensionality of the constructs. If the factor structure of the constructs
has been properly specified the model should exhibit good fit. The model is accepted or
rejected based on the extent to which it displays good fit. Chi-square difference tests

61

were also conducted to assess the relative improvement in fit between the models. If the
one-factor model does not result in significant harm to the model then the four constructs,
reactions to an affirmative action policy and the three measures of reactions to
beneficiaries, would be combined.
The adequacy of the model was also determined based on its validity. When
specifying a latent variable, it is assumed that each observed variable, or indicator, that
composes the factor actually measures the construct. When this is the case, the indicators
will each contribute to the latent factor by yielding a significant “loading” on the factor.
A standardized loading reflects the degree to which the corresponding indicator
contributes to the common variability captured by the latent variable (Hecht, 2001).
Therefore, convergent validity is exhibited to the extent that the indicators converge, or
have high loadings, on the factors. Poor convergent validity within sets of indicators
suggests that the model may have too few factors (Kline, 2005).
In contrast, discriminant validity is indicated if the covariances between all of the
variables are less than 1.0. If the model has poor discriminant validity, as evidenced by
perfect correlations or correlations that are close to perfection, this is an indication that
the model has too many factors (Kline, 2005). According to Hecht (2001) poor
discriminant validity is problematic for several reasons. First, poor discriminant validity
as demonstrated by highly correlated variables represents a source of model
misspecification. When the highly correlated variables are predictors or explanatory
variables the fit of the model to the data may be reduced. Moreover, this situation tends
to result in an increase of the standard errors thereby reducing the precision of statistical

62

tests of relations among predictors variables and dependent variables. Finally, poor
discriminant validity can also lead to suppression when two or more predictor or
predictors variables are highly correlated (Maassen & Bakker, 2001).
In order for a model to be deemed adequate the factors must also demonstrate
high reliability. The established cutoff for acceptable reliability is .70. Since coefficient
alpha is a function of the factor loadings, high convergent validity of items on a given
construct results in high reliability. In addition, the variance extracted by the factor(s)
should be at least .50. The final criterion upon which the models will be evaluated is the
dimensionality of the items. If the factor structure for the scales is properly specified the
indicators will load on only one factor and there will be no crossloadings. In other words,
items should be related to one construct such as affective reactions to affirmative action
policies, and unrelated to affective reactions to beneficiaries.
The models being compared are nested, or hierarchical in nature, therefore they
share several similarities. For instance, in each of the models tested the factors were
assigned a measurement range by fixing the variance to a value of 1.0. In addition, all of
the factors were specified to be correlated with one another. Moreover, based on
previous research (i.e., Jost & Thompson, 2000) social dominance orientation was
specified to be a multi-dimensional construct with a two-factor structure: one factor
representing generalized opposition to equality and the second factor reflecting groupbased dominance. Finally, each of the tested models exhibited Mardia’s Normalized
Estimate values greater than 15, indicating the presence of multivariate non-normality.
When the data are multivariately non-normally distributed robust parameter estimates
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must be interpreted. For example, the chi-square fit statistic is sensitive to violations of
the assumption of multivariate normality (Kline, 2005). As a result, the Satorra-Bentler
scaled chi-square is preferred when this assumption is known to be violated. The
Satorra-Bentler chi-square is an adjusted chi-square which penalizes the fit statistic for
the amount of kurtosis in the data. This statistic is reported for each of the models that
were evaluated.
In the first model tested all items assessing reactions to both affirmative action
policies and affirmative action beneficiaries were forced to load on one factor. Thus, the
single measure of reactions to the policies and the three measures of reactions to
beneficiaries were treated as a single construct. This was accomplished by fixing the
covariances between the factors representing these variables to a value of 1.0. This, in
essence, makes the factors identical, which is the same as replacing the four factors
representing each of the four separate constructs with just one (Kline, 2005). The one
factor model of reactions to affirmative action policies and beneficiaries was fitted to the
data with the ML method in EQS, and a converged, admissible solution was obtained.
Mardia’s Normalized Estimate for the model is 37.955 indicating the presence of
multivariate non-normality. Values of the selected fit indexes are as follows:
X2 (2665) = 7468.637, p = .000, CFI = .573, RMSEA = .085, with a 90% confidence
interval .082-.087. If the scales representing Attitudes Toward Soft Preferential
Treatment, Affective Reactions to Beneficiaries, Willingness to Work and Socialize with
Beneficiaries and Perceptions of Beneficiaries’ Abilities reflect one factor only then this
model should exhibit good fit. However, the one factor model exhibits extremely poor fit
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based on both the CFI and the RMSEA. This provides evidence that the four measures
do not capture a single, unidimensional construct. Therefore, the one-factor model of
reactions to policies and beneficiaries is rejected.
A two-factor model of reactions to affirmative action policies and beneficiaries
was also tested. The first factor consists of the Attitudes Toward Soft Preferential
Treatment Scale. The second factor consists of the three scales assessing reactions to
affirmative action beneficiaries: the Affective Reactions to Beneficiaries Scale,
Willingness to Work and Socialize with Beneficiaries Scale, and the Perceptions of
Beneficiaries’ Abilities Scale. Thus, this two factor model of the dependent measures
was consistent with the way the constructs were originally conceived; reactions toward
the policy were viewed as distinct from reactions to the beneficiary. Testing of this
model was accomplished by releasing the constraints on the covariances between factor
one and the factors representing the three scales measuring reactions to beneficiaries, thus
allowing the covariances to be freely estimated. However, the covariances between the
three reactions to beneficiaries scales were still constrained to a value of 1.0.
The two-factor model of reactions to affirmative action policies and beneficiaries
was fitted to the data with the ML method in EQS, and a converged, admissible solution
was obtained. Values of the selected fit indexes are as follows: X2 (2661) = 6355.014, p
= .000, CFI = .672, RMSEA = .074, with a 90% confidence interval .072-.077. Both the
CFI and RMSEA demonstrate that the two-factor model of reactions to affirmative action
policies and beneficiaries is inadequate. Typically, a chi-square difference test would be
conducted to determine the relative improvement in model fit of the two-factor model
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over the one-factor model. This test is appropriate because the one-factor model is
actually a restricted version of the two-factor model. Therefore, the models are nested
(Kline, 2005). However, since both the one-factor model and the two-factor model failed
to provide adequate fit to the data the chi-square difference test was not conducted.
Finally, a multifactor model was tested in which each of the four factors
representing reactions to affirmative action policies and beneficiaries (3 factors
representing reactions to beneficiaries and one factor representing reactions to the policy)
were specified to load on a separate factor. In addition, the positively and negatively
worded items on the Affective Reactions to Beneficiaries were specified to load on
separate factors. It is not unusual for positively and negatively worded items on the same
scale to load on separate factors (Miller & Cleary, 1993; Pilotte & Gable, 1990). Both
the positively and negatively worded items on the scale were taken from a study
conducted by Stephan and colleagues (1999).
The five-factor model of reactions to affirmative action policies and beneficiaries
was fitted to the data with the ML method in EQS, and a converged, admissible solution
was obtained. Values of the selected fit indexes are as follows: X2 (2655) = 4239.366, p
= .000, CFI = .859, RMSEA = .049, with a 90% confidence interval .046-.051. These
results are generally favorable except for the CFI. While the results suggest that the
dimensionality of the constructs representing reactions to affirmative action policies and
beneficiaries is properly specified, the value of the CFI indicates that there is still some
degree of misfit in the model. This suggests that some post hoc model fitting is needed to
improve the CFI to an acceptable level.
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The validity of the five-factor model was evaluated to determine the adequacy of
the measurement model. The specification of a multifactor CFA model in which each
indicator loads on only one factor provides a precise test of convergent and discriminant
validity (Kline, 2005). When specifying a latent variable, it is assumed that each
observed variable that composes the factor actually measures the construct. When this is
the case, the observed variables will each contribute to the latent factor by yielding a
significant “loading” on the factor. A standardized loading reflects the degree to which
the corresponding indicator contribute to the common variability captured by the latent
variable, or the convergent validity of the construct. Convergent validity is indicated by
standardized factor loadings above .4.
Examination of the standardized loadings for the five factors indicates that the
five-factor model exhibits high convergent validity. Only one indicator, item 10 of the
Affective Reactions to Beneficiaries Scale, failed to load on its corresponding factor.
Excluding this item, the standardized loadings for the five factors range from .421 to
.950. This indicates a high degree of convergent validity for these factors. The
standardized loadings and communalities for the
factors are presented in Table 1.1. In addition, each of the factors exhibits high construct
reliability and the variance extracted from the indicators by each of the five factors is
greater than .50. The variance extracted by the factor is based on the formula:

[(SUM(sli2)]/[(SUM(sli2) + (SUM(ei))]
where sli is the standardized loadings for the factor indicators and ei are the
corresponding error terms, which is 1 minus the squared loading, or communality, for the
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indicator. The reliability of the factor is also a function of the standardized factor
loadings. The reliability of the factor is based on the formula:

[(SUM(sli))2]/[(SUM(sli))2 + (SUM(ei))]
However, reliability may be influenced by the number of indicators such that the greater
the number of indicators the higher the reliability. The reliability and variance extracted
for each of the five factors is presented in Table 1.2.
Finally, review of the covariances between the factors provides a test of
discriminant validity. Since the factors were assigned a measurement range by fixing the
variance of the factors to a value of 1.0 the covariances between the factors are
standardized and may be interpreted as correlations. The correlations between the five
factors range from .174 to .625 which indicates that the factors are measuring distinct
constructs. The correlation matrix for the model is presented in Table 1.3. Based on the
information obtained from the fit indexes, the standardized factor loadings and the
correlations between the factors the five-factor model of reactions to affirmative action
policies and beneficiaries is retained.
Post Hoc Model Fitting
While the selected five factor model of the dependent variables was a marked
improvement over the other models tested the Comparative Fit Index is still below the
accepted cutoff value indicating good model fit. This suggests that there are misspecified
parameters in the model. This led to examination of the individual measures and items as
a means to refine the scales. Several parameters within the model were respecified.
Model respecification was based on several factors: feasibility of the parameter estimates,
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statistical significance of the parameter estimates, identification of those parameters with
the largest standardized residuals and the factor loadings. In addition, a specification
search was conducted for the indicator error terms. In EQS malfitting parameters (e.g.,
error terms) are identified via the multivariate Lagrange Multipliers test (Byrne, 1994).
Examination of the measurement equations and variances for the indicators
indicates that the estimated values for all of the individual parameters are reasonable and
statistically significant. For example, the standard error for each indicator’s measurement
equation and variance are neither abnormally large nor do they approach zero. If either
condition existed it would be an indication that the model is incorrect. A standard error
approaching zero would indicate the linear dependence of the related parameter upon
some other parameter in the model (Byrne, 1994). Similarly, a negative error variance
suggests one of the following problems: high levels of multicollinearity between the
variables or the presence of outliers. In addition, each of these parameter estimates is
statistically different from zero. However, this may be due to the large sample size.
Based on the information obtained from the standardized residuals the average offdiagonal value is .0597, which reflects fairly good fit to the data. The frequency
distribution of the standardized residuals reveals that 82.66% of the residual values fall
between -.10 and .10; 9.15% of the residual values fall between -.10 and -.3 while 7.9%
fall between .10 and .30. Only .14% of the values fall between -.30 and -.40 and .14%
fall between .30 and .40. Standardized residuals of this magnitude (.3-.4) are indicative
of significant model misfit associated with the parameters, so an examination of the
individual items that were contributing to error in measurement followed.
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Table 1.1. Standardized Factor Loadings and Communalities for a Five-Factor Model of Reactions to
Affirmative Action Policies and Beneficiaries.

Indicator
Soft 1
Soft 2
Soft 3
Soft 4
Soft 5
Soft 6
Soft 7
WWS 1
WWS 2
WWS 3
WWS 4
WWS 5
WWS 6
WWS 7
POBA 1
POBA 2
POBA 3
POBA 4
POBA 5
POBA 6
POBA 7
POBA 8
POBA 9
POBA 10
POBA 11
POBA 12
Affect 1
Affect 3
Affect 5
Affect 7
Affect 9
Affect 11
Affect 2
Affect 4
Affect 6
Affect 8
Affect 10
Affect 12

Factor 1
Loading Comm
0.532
0.284
0.859
0.737
0.596
0.355
0.783
0.613
0.870
0.757
0.919
0.845
0.950
0.902

Factor 2
Loading Comm

0.874
0.922
0.948
0.932
0.898
0.808
0.829

Factor 3
Loading Comm

Factor 4
Loading Comm

Factor 5
Loading Comm

0.763
0.850
0.898
0.869
0.806
0.653
0.688
0.796
0.797
0.832
0.733
0.797
0.717
0.426
0.651
0.799
0.817
0.828
0.852

0.634
0.635
0.692
0.537
0.635
0.515
0.227
0.424
0.639
0.668
0.686
0.724
0.830
0.880
0.426
0.759
0.787
0.844

0.688
0.774
0.181
0.576
0.619
0.712
0.421
0.792
0.573
0.844
0.235
0.652

Soft = Attitudes toward “soft” preferential treatment
WWS = Willingness to work/socialize with beneficiaries
POBA = Perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities
Affect = Affective reactions to beneficiaries
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0.178
0.628
0.328
0.711
0.055
0.426

Table 1.2: Factor Reliability and Variance Extracted

Factor
OEQ
GBD
POI
ATD
Soft
WWS
POBA
Aff_N
Aff_P

Reliability
.90
.89
.82
.84
.98
.96
.94
.89
.77

Variance
Extracted
.52
.52
.35
.46
.64
.79
.58
.59
.39

OEQ = Opposition to equality (SDO)
GBD = Group based dominance (SDO)
POI = Perceptions of race-based inequities
ATD = Attitudes toward diversity
Aff_N = Negative affective reactions to beneficiaries
Aff_P = Positive affective reactions to beneficiaries
Table 1.3. Correlation Matrix for Five-Factor Model of Reactions to Affirmative Action Policies and
Beneficiaries
Factor
WWS
POB
Aff_
Aff_P
OEQ
GBD
POI
ATD Belong Soft
A
N
OEQ
—
-.739*
—
GBD
-.051*
.131*
—
POI
-.482*
.620*
.241*
—
ATD
.117*
.062*
.189* .166*
—
Belong
-.229*
.329*
.327* .503*
.100*
—
Soft
-.413*
.476*
.149* .461*
.032*
.277*
—
WWS
-.474*
.474*
.138* .536*
.045*
.506* .521*
—
POBA
-.372*
.363*
.182* .371*
.031*
.174* .625*
.402*
—
Aff_N
-.346*
.400*
.195* .484* -.015* .437* .525*
.564* .455*
Aff_P
—
Note: * = significant at the .05 level
Aff_N = Negative Affective Reactions to Beneficiaries
Aff_P = Positive Affective Reactions to Beneficiaries

Information on residuals for individual items serves as an indicator of the items that
contribute the most error to measurement.
The largest off-diagonal value is -.383 and reflects model misfit associated with
variables V77, item 9 of the Affective Reactions to Beneficiaries Scale, and V70, item 2
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of the Affective Reactions to Beneficiaries Scale. In fact, variable V70 is listed five
times among the parameters with the largest standardized residuals indicating that a
substantial amount of the misfit in the model is associated with this variable. Variables
V8 and V20, items 3 and 15 respectively of the Social Dominance Orientation, were each
listed five times among the parameters with the largest standardized residuals. Similarly,
variable V23, item 2 of the Perceptions of Inequities Scale, is listed six times among the
parameters with the largest standardized residuals. Again, this indicates that a substantial
amount of the model misfit is associated with the variable.
The factor loadings were reviewed to determine the indicators that failed to load
on their respective factor. Loadings less than the established cutoff value of .40 are an
indication of problematic items. Overall, the factor loadings appear to be in good shape.
However, there were several items that failed to load on their corresponding factor. For
example, variable V22, item 1 of the Perceptions of Inequities Scale, has a factor loading
of .295 which is well below the established cutoff value of .40. The factor loading for
item 2 of the Perceptions of Inequities Scale (V23), .378, is also below the established
cutoff value. This is particularly noteworthy since this item was also indicated to be
problematic based on examination of the parameters with the largest standardized
residuals. Item 4 of the Perceptions of Inequities Scale (V60) also failed to load on the
factor with a factor loading of .355. Finally, item 8 of the Attitudes Toward Diversity
Scale (V38) and item 10 of the Affective Reactions to Beneficiaries Scale (V78) failed to
load on their factors with loadings of .256 and .235, respectively. In addition, the loading
for item 15 of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale, .408, is only slightly above the
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established cutoff value of .40. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the communality, .166,
and the error term, .834, for this indicator suggest that error rather than the factor explains
most of the variance in the indicator.
As an additional source of information on the adequacy of the measures the error
terms were evaluated based on the results of the multivariate Lagrange Multiplier
statistic. Unlike the univariate LM test, the multivariate statistic does not test restrictions
in the model independently. Thus, the multivariate statistic typically results in fewer
statistically significant LM chi-squares than the univariate test. Therefore, model
respecifications are based on the cumulative multivariate statistic. Evaluation of the
cumulative multivariate statistic along with its univariate increment indicates that there
are several malfitting error terms that stand distinctly apart from the rest: E15, E14;
E29,E27; E34,E32; E36,E35; E58,E57; E61,E60; E67,E66; E68,E66; E68;E67; and
E80,E74.
Based on the accumulated information on the adequacy of the measures they were
revised. The model was rerun with several model respecifications. First, the following
items were omitted from the model: items 3 and 15 of the Social Dominance Orientation
Scale; items 1, 2, and 4 of the Perceptions of Inequities Scale; item 8 of the Attitudes
Toward Diversity Scale; and items 2 and 10 of the Affective Reactions to Beneficiaries
Scale. In addition, the error terms for the following items were correlated: items 9 and 10
of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale (E15,E14); items 6 and 8 (E29,E27) of the
Perceptions of Inequities Scale; items 2 and 4 (E34,E32) and items 5 and 6 (E36,E35) of
the Attitudes Toward Diversity Scale; items 1 and 2 (E58,E57), 4 and 5 (E61,E60), and
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items 10 and 11 (E67,E66), items 10 and 12 (E68,E66) and items 11 and 12 (E68,E67) of
the Perceptions of Beneficiaries’ Abilities Scale; and items 6 and 12 of the Affective
Reactions to Beneficiaries Scale (E80,E74). Correlated error terms represent situations in
which knowing the residual of one indicator helps in knowing the residual associated
with another indicator. While correlated error terms in a model are less than ideal it is a
common occurrence with attitudinal scales (Byrne, 1994). Correlated error terms may
reflect any of the following conditions: similarly written items, common method bias, or
socially acceptable responding (Kline, 2005).
The respecified model was tested. Mardia’s Normalized Estimate for the
respecified model, 41.88, indicates multivariate non-normality. Therefore, robust
estimates were interpreted for the model. Values of the selected fit indexes for the
respecified model are: X2 (1960) = 2597.752, p = .000, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .036, with a
90% confidence interval .032-.040. The respecified model provides good fit to the data
based on the selected fit indexes. Therefore, the chi-square difference test can be
computed to assess the relative improvement in model fit between the one-, two-, and
five-factor models of reactions to affirmative action policies and beneficiaries. When
models are nested, the difference in X2 between the two models is itself chi-square
distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in degrees of freedom
between the two models. However, when the Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square statistic
is interpreted due to violations of the multivariate normality assumption, the difference
between these scaled statistics is not chi-square distributed. Therefore, use of a corrected
chi-square difference test is necessary. The results of the chi-square difference test for the
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one- and five-factor models are: X2D (705) = 5975.430, p = .000. Similarly, the results of
the chi-square difference test for the two- and five-factor models are: X2D (701) =
4427.278, p = .000. These results demonstrate that the five-factor model of reactions to
affirmative action policies and beneficiaries is superior to both the one- and two-factor
models. The final model consisting of the indicators and their loadings on their
respective factors is presented in Appendix E.
Evaluation of the Structural Model
Once an appropriate measurement model was obtained using confirmatory factor
analysis, structural equation modeling was used to examine the causal relations among
the latent variables. A diagram of the structural model is presented in Figure 1. The fivefactor CFA model of reactions to affirmative action policies and beneficiaries was
respecified as a structural model in which (1) the observed variable gender was added to
the model as an exogenous variable, (2) the two factors representing social dominance
orientation are endogenous explanatory variables, (3) the perceptions of inequities factor
and the attitudes toward diversity factor are both mediators, and (4) the five factors
representing reactions to affirmative action policies and beneficiaries are all outcome
variables. Examination of the correlation between the two factors representing social
dominance orientation (group based dominance and opposition to equality) reveals that
they are highly, but negatively correlated (See table 5). Since the two factors will act as
predictor variables in the structural model multicollinearity among them is likely to be
problematic (Hecht, 2001). One way that these problems may be mitigated, however, is
by combining the two highly correlated factors into one factor. In the present situation

75

this is not plausible since the factors are also negatively correlated. Therefore, a higherorder latent variable was created to capture the common variance between the two SDO
factors (Bentler, 1995).
However, adding the higher-order factor results in an identification problem
because the higher-order factor has only two indicators. With only two indicators unique
estimates of the free parameters cannot be obtained because there are more parameters to
be estimated than there are observations. Therefore, several steps were taken to resolve
the identification issue. First, the higher-order factor was scaled by fixing the path to the
factor representing group based dominance to 1.0. In addition, the disturbance terms for
the two factors representing SDO were constrained to be equal (Byrne, 1994).
Figure 1.1 Diagram of Structural Model.

Soft
ATD

OEQ
WWS

GENDER
SDO

GBD

POBA

POI

Aff_N

Aff_P
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It is inappropriate to scale endogenous variables in a structural model by fixing
the factor variance to 1.0, therefore, each factor was scaled by fixing the path to the
indicator with the highest loading to 1.0. In addition, the LM test was set to identify
misspecified paths that flow from independent to dependent factors and from one
dependent factor to another, as well as misspecified covariances among the disturbance
terms.
The structural model was fitted to the data using the ML method in EQS, and a
converged, admissible solution was obtained. Values of selected fit indexes are as
follows: X2 (2046) = 2791.904, p = .000, CFI = .89, RMSEA = .038, with a 90%
confidence interval .034-.042. With the exception of the CFI, the fit statistics are within
the acceptable range to indicate adequate fit to the data. However, the value of the CFI
indicates that there is some degree of model misspecification.
Based on the information obtained from the standardized residuals the average
off-diagonal value is .0582, which reflects fairly good fit to the data. The frequency
distribution of the standardized residuals reveals that 82.63% of the residual values fall
between -.10 and .10; 8.32% of the residual values fall between -.10 and -.3 while 8.87%
fall between .10 and .30. Only .18% of the values fall between -.30 and -.40 and none
fall between .30 and .40. Standardized residuals of this magnitude (.3-.4) are indicative
of significant model misfit associated with the parameters. The largest off-diagonal value
is -.359 and reflects model misfit associated with variables V11 and V15, items 6 and 10,
respectively, of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale. In fact, variable V11 is listed
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seven times among the parameters with the largest standardized residuals indicating that a
substantial amount of the misfit in the model is associated with this variable.
Another source of model misspecification may result from paths that should be
specified, but were omitted from the model. Examination of the LM test reveals that only
two suggested paths stand apart from the others. The F3,F2 parameter stands distinctly
apart from the other parameters. This represents a structural path from the opposition to
equality factor to the group based dominance factor of the social dominance orientation
construct. After this path the univariate increment decreases sharply from X2(1) = 56.78
to X2(2) = 18.04. These results suggest that if this path were to be specified in the model,
opposition to equality would have a substantial impact on group based dominance. While
the addition of this path may improve the model fit it is based only on statistical criteria
and, in this instance, is not substantively meaningful. In fact, this relationship makes no
sense because both factors comprise the construct of social dominance orientation. In
addition, a higher-order factor has been added to the model to account for the common
variance between the two factors. As a result, the F3,F2 parameter is ignored with
respect to model respecification.
Incorporation of the next parameter (F6,F8) suggests that Perceptions of
Beneficiaries’ Abilities has a substantial impact on Attitudes Toward “Soft” Preferential
Treatment. The addition of this path is also theoretically problematic since attitudes
toward the policy are thought to “spillover” onto beneficiaries, but attitudes toward
beneficiaries are not expected to “spillover” onto reactions to policies. Still, it is
reasonable to expect some degree of relationship between the two factors, particularly
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between the disturbance terms for the factors. After this path the univariate increment
decreases from X2(2) = 18.04 to X2(3) = 10.91. While there are only slight changes in the
univariate increment for the remaining parameters listed in the LM test one path
suggested by the test is notable F10,F6. This path suggests that Attitudes Toward “Soft”
Preferential Treatment have a substantial impact on positive Affective Reactions to
Beneficiaries. Again, while it does not make sense to add this path to the model it is
reasonable to expect a relationship between the disturbance terms of the factors.
Disturbance terms represent all omitted causes of the corresponding endogenous variable
(Kline, 2005). Since individuals’ attitudes toward affirmative action policies have been
found to “spillover” onto attitudes toward beneficiaries (Barnes-Nacoste, 1992), it is
reasonable to assume that there may be a common cause of both attitudes toward policies
and beneficiaries that is not accounted for in the model.
Given the information gathered from the initial analyses, the model was rerun
with several respecifications. First, V11, item 6 of the Social Dominance Orientation
Scale, was dropped from the model. In addition, the disturbance terms for the Attitudes
Toward “Soft” Preferential Treatment and Perceptions of Beneficiaries’ Abilities factors
and for the Attitudes Toward “Soft” Preferential Treatment and positive Affective
Reactions to Beneficiaries factors were specified to covary. Disturbance covariances
reflect the assumption that the corresponding endogenous variables share at least one
common cause that is not accounted for in the model (Kline, 2005). The respecified
model was fitted to the data using the ML method in EQS, and a converged, admissible
solution was obtained. Values of selected fit indexes are as follows: X2 (1980) =
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2659.679, p = .000, CFI = .90, RMSEA = .037, with a 90% confidence interval .033.041. These results indicate that the specified model adequately reproduces the observed
covariances among the variables.
Since the predicted model adequately reproduces the relations among the
observed variables no further respecification was needed. The following items were
omitted from the final scales: items 3, 6, and 15 of the Social Dominance Orientation
Scale; items 7 and 8 of the Attitudes Toward Diversity Scale; items 1, 2, and 4 of the
Perceptions of Inequities Scale; item 6 of the Willingness to Work and Socialize with
Beneficiaries; items 2 and 10 of the Affective Reactions to Beneficiaries Scale; no items
were omitted from the Attitudes Toward “Soft” Preferential Treatment and Perceptions of
Beneficiaries Scales. The scale means for each of the constructs are presented in Table
1.4. In addition the final structural model with parameter estimates are found in Figure
2.1.
Table 1.4: Factor Means for Final Scales.

Factor
SDO
POI
ATD
Soft
WWS
POBA
Aff_N
Aff_P

Mean
5.54
3.83
5.22
3.60
5.78
4.29
5.34
4.58
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Figure 2.1: Final Structural Model with Unstandardized Parameter Estimates.

Soft

.775
ATD

.107
.286
1.161

-.093

-1.124

-.126
-.800
GENDER

WWS

2.457
.264

SDO

-.005
-1.270

1.266
-.018

-.278
.485

1.973

POBA

.010
2.370

POI

.061
.064
Aff_P

Suppression
Examination of the standardized regression coefficients for the proposed model
shows that many of them fall outside of the normal range of -1 to 1. This finding
suggests the presence of a suppression effect (Kline, 2005). According to Conger (1974),
a suppressor variable increases the predictive validity of another variable or set of
variables when added to a regression equation. This increase in predictive validity is
manifested by an increase in the regression weight for the suppressed variable. In
practice, suppression is indicated when the path coefficient for a predictor is greater in
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Aff_N

absolute value than that predictor’s bivariate correlation with the dependent variable
(Kline, 2005). A suppression effect may also be indicated by beta weights that fall
outside of the range of -1 to 1, or by path coefficients that differ in sign from the bivariate
correlation between the predictor and dependent variable.
While the phenomenon of statistical suppression is typically discussed in terms of
regression it is also applicable to structural equation modeling since regression analysis is
simply a specialized case of structural equation modeling (Maassen & Bakker, 2001). In
fact, suppression may be more of an issue in structural equation models because the
intercorrelations among the latent variables are estimated higher than in models with only
observed variables in order to correct for attenuation due to measurement errors.
Therefore, the probability that a suppressor effect will appear increases to the extent that
the structural model entails correction for measurement error in the suppressed variable.
There are three types of suppression effects: classical suppression, net or negative
suppression, and reciprocal or cooperative suppression. In the present study, a net
suppression effect was identified. Net suppression is characterized by the addition of a
second predictor whose correlation with the dependent variable is nonzero, but smaller in
magnitude than that of the first predictor. In addition, the correlation between the two
predictors is substantially large. When such a situation occurs the semipartial correlation
between the predictor with the larger correlation with the dependent variable is inflated.
Moreover, the semipartial correlation between the predictor with the smaller correlation
with the dependent variable reverses its sign. Therefore, while the bivariate correlation
between the suppressed variable and the dependent variable may be positive in direction
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the semipartial correlation between the suppressed variable and the dependent variable is
negative.
As previously stated, several of the standardized regression coefficients for the
proposed model are inflated and fall outside of the normal range of -1 to 1. This is
indicative of a suppression effect. The regression coefficients found in the standardized
solution are equivalent to the correlation between a given predictor and the dependent
variable controlling for the effects of all other predictors. Under normal circumstances
the standardized regression coefficients should be smaller in magnitude than the bivariate
correlations between the predictors and the dependent variables. The standardized
solution and correlation matrix for the structural model are presented below. Review of
the standardized solution and correlation matrix reveals inflated semipartial correlations
between the higher-order factor of social dominance orientation (F11) and willingness to
work and socialize with beneficiaries (F7), perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities (F8),
and both factors representing affective reactions to beneficiaries (F9 & F10). Therefore,
social dominance orientation is obviously involved in the suppression effect. Moreover,
it is important to note that the coefficients associated with this factor are all positive in
direction which indicates that the higher-order factor of social dominance orientation is
the suppressed variable.
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Table 1.5: Correlation Matrix for Final Structural Model

Factor
Gende
r
SDO
POI
ATD
Soft
WWS
POBA
Aff_N
Aff_P

Gend
er
—

SDO

POI

ATD

Soft

WWS

.176
.048
.208
.071
.081
.108
.052
.087

—
.312
.906
.485
.713
.685
.598
.681

—
.282
.358
.219
.224
.246
.268

—
.531
.482
.574
.347
.497

—
.262
.509
.205
.379

—
.532
.604
.594

POB
A

—
.461
.498

Aff_N

Aff_P

—
.539

—

Attitudes toward diversity (F5) is also involved in the suppression effect as
demonstrated by the inflated regression coefficient between this variable and negative
affective reactions to beneficiaries (F9). The regression coefficient representing the
semipartial correlation between attitudes toward diversity and willingness to work and
socialize with beneficiaries is inflated, as well. Again, it is important to note the direction
of the correlations between attitudes toward diversity (F5) and the dependent variables
(F7, F8, F9, & F10). Each of the semipartial correlations is negative, but the bivariate
correlations between these variables are positive (See Table 1.5).

Finally, examination

of the correlation between the higher-order factor of social dominance orientation (F11)
and attitudes toward diversity (F5) indicates a substantial relationship between the two
predictors. As a result, attitudes toward diversity acts as the suppressor of variance in
social dominance orientation that is irrelevant to each of the dependent variables.
Removal of this irrelevant variance increases the regression weights for social dominance
orientation.
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In summary, based on the information gathered from the standardized solution
and correlation matrix, it is possible to conclude that a net suppression effect has
occurred. The net suppression effect is demonstrated by the following: (1) The
correlations between attitudes toward diversity and each of the dependent variables is
nonzero, but smaller in magnitude than the correlations between social dominance
orientation and each of the dependent variables; (2) The correlation between social
dominance orientation and attitudes toward diversity is substantially large; (3) The
semipartial correlations between social dominance orientation and each of the dependent
variables are inflated; and (4) the semipartial correlations between attitudes toward
diversity and each of the dependent variables are negative in sign while the bivariate
correlations between these variables are positive in direction. Because of the nature of
these relationships attitudes toward diversity suppresses the variance in social dominance
orientation that is irrelevant to each of the dependent variables (i.e., willingness to work
and socialize, perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities, and affective reactions to
beneficiaries).
Tests of Hypotheses
Once an appropriate structural model was obtained the hypotheses were evaluated
based on the results of the unstandardized solution. Typically, the results of the
standardized solution are reported. The standardized regression coefficients, or beta
weights, presented in the standardized solution indicate the expected difference in the
dependent variable based on a given explanatory variable while controlling for all other
explanatory variables. Standardized estimates are preferred because they can be directly
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compared across predictors. In addition, beta weights are adjusted for intercorrelations
among the explanatory variables (Kline, 2005). However, standardized regression
coefficients can be more difficult to interpret since they are expressed in standard
deviations while unstandardized coefficients are expressed in terms of raw score
differences in the dependent variable. Moreover, examination of the beta weights for the
proposed model shows that many of them fall outside of the normal range of -1 to 1.
This finding suggests the presence of a suppression situation (Kline, 2005).
Hypothesis 1 predicted that gender would have a substantial impact on attitudes
toward affirmative action. Specifically, women would have significantly more positive
attitudes toward affirmative action than White males. However, this relationship would
be mediated by SDO, perceptions of inequities and attitudes toward diversity. Review of
the unstandardized solution reveals that gender does not have a significant direct effect
on attitudes toward “soft” preferential treatment (B = -.126, z = -.720, p > .05).
According to Kline (2005), statistically significant indirect effects but not direct effects
represent the strongest demonstration of a mediator effect. Such a situation is especially
likely when suppression occurs because the mediated and direct effects have different
signs. For example, MacKinnon and colleagues (2002) found that the direct relationship
between a predictor and an outcome variable may be near zero even when the mediated
effect is significantly nonzero if the mediated and direct effects have opposite signs. In
the present study, a product-of-coefficients test was used to test for mediation
(MacKinnon et al., 2002). In addition, the multivariate delta method was used to estimate
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the standard error for the indirect effects in order to test their significance (Taylor,
MacKinnon & Tein, 2007).
Again, because of suppression the indirect effect of gender on attitudes toward
“soft” preferential treatment may be significantly nonzero although the direct effect is
nonsignificant. Therefore, the indirect effect of gender on attitudes toward “soft”
preferential treatment was tested even though there was no significant direct effect of
gender on attitudes toward the policy. The unstandardized regression coefficient for the
indirect effect indicates that gender does have a significant indirect effect on attitudes
toward “soft” preferential treatment (B = .327, z = 2.402, p < .05) which is transmitted
via SDO, perceptions of race-based inequities and attitudes toward diversity. In other
words, in comparison to their male counterparts, female participants’ support for the
“soft” preferential treatment policy was .327 higher via all presumed causal pathways
between these variables.
EQS combines the effects transmitted by each of the mediators into a pooled test
of the indirect effects. Several Sobel tests were conducted in order to test the significance
of the indirect effect of gender transmitted by each of the mediators. First, the indirect
effect of gender on attitudes toward “soft” preferential treatment via SDO was tested.
The Sobel tests indicates that the impact of gender on attitudes toward “soft” preferential
treatment is not transmitted via SDO (B = .012, z = -.29, p = .77). Neither was the impact
of gender on attitudes toward “soft” preferential treatment transmitted via perceptions of
race-based inequities (B = .005, z = -.11, p = .92) nor attitudes toward diversity (B =
.083, z = 1.22, p = .22). Next, a product-of-coefficients test was conducted using the
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multivariate delta method to estimate the standard error in order to test the significance of
the three-path mediated effects. The results indicate that the indirect effect of gender on
attitudes toward “soft” preferential treatment transmitted via SDO and perceptions of
race-based inequities was significant (B = -.037, z = 2.15, p < .05). However, the indirect
effect of gender on attitudes toward “soft” preferential treatment transmitted by SDO and
attitudes toward diversity was not significant (B = .238, z = 1.84, p > .05). Thus,
hypothesis 1 was partially supported.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that individuals with higher levels of social dominance
orientation will have more negative views of affirmative action. Moreover, this
relationship would be partially mediated by perceptions of inequities and attitudes toward
diversity. Based on the unstandardized solution, social dominance orientation social
dominance orientation failed to have a direct influence on attitudes toward “soft”
preferential treatment (B = -.093, z = -.292, p > .05). However, SDO did have a
significant indirect effect on attitudes toward “soft” preferential treatment via perceptions
of inequities and attitudes toward diversity (B = 1.039, z = 3.546, p < .05). Thus, for
every 1-point decrease in SDO we expect about a 1-point increase in attitudes toward
“soft” preferential treatment via both perceptions of inequities and attitudes toward
diversity. A product-of-coefficients test using the multivariate delta method of estimating
the standard error was used to test the mediating effects of perceptions of inequities and
attitudes toward diversity separately. The results of the Sobel test indicate that the
indirect effect of SDO on attitudes toward “soft” preferential treatment was transmitted
by perceptions of race-based inequities is significant (B = .139, z = 2.55, p = .01). The
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indirect effect of SDO on attitudes toward “soft” preferential treatment via attitudes
toward diversity is also significant (B = .900, z = 2.88, p = .00). These findings indicate
that the relationship between social dominance orientation and attitudes toward “soft”
preferential treatment is completely mediated by both perceptions of inequities and
attitudes toward diversity. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was supported by the results.
Hypothesis 3 focused on reactions to beneficiaries and predicted that individuals
exhibiting higher levels of social dominance orientation have more negative attitudes
toward beneficiaries of affirmative action. In the present study, attitudes toward
beneficiaries of affirmative action are composed of three constructs: willingness to work
and socialize with beneficiaries, perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities and affective
reactions to beneficiaries. The relationships between SDO and each of the three aspects
of reactions to beneficiaries were expected to be partially mediated by perceptions of
inequities and attitudes toward diversity.
Hypothesis 3a predicted a negative relationship between social dominance
orientation and willingness to work and socialize with beneficiaries. Specifically,
individuals with higher levels of SDO are expected to be less willing to work and
socialize with beneficiaries of affirmative action. In addition, we expected that this
relationship would be partially mediated by both perceptions of race-based inequities and
attitudes toward diversity. Based on the unstandardized regression coefficient, SDO does
have a significant direct effect on willingness to work and socialize with beneficiaries (B
= 2.457, z = 4.479, p < .05). This means that a 1-point decrease in SDO is associated
with about a 2.5-point increase in willingness to work and socialize with beneficiaries. It
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is important to note, however, that because of suppression this estimate is inflated.
Moreover, SDO also has a significant indirect effect on willingness to work and socialize
with beneficiaries (B = -1.307, z = -2.421, p < .05) via perceptions of inequities and
attitudes toward diversity. It is important to note that the coefficient for the mediating
effect is negative because of a suppression effect. The Sobel test indicates that the
indirect effect of SDO on willingness to interact with beneficiaries transmitted by
attitudes toward diversity is significant (B = -1.304, z = -2.54, p = .01) while the indirect
effect transmitted by perceptions of inequities is not significant (B = -.002, z = -.05, p =
.96). Therefore, hypothesis 3a received partial support.
Hypothesis 3b predicted that individuals exhibiting higher levels of social
dominance orientation would have more negative perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities.
Moreover, the relationship was hypothesized to be partially mediated by perceptions of
inequities and attitudes toward diversity. Examination of the unstandardized solution
reveals that social dominance orientation does have a direct impact on perceptions of
beneficiaries’ abilities (B = 1.266, z = 4.153, p < .05). Thus, a 1-point decrease in SDO
is associated with about a 1.25-point increase in perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities.
Put another way, higher levels of social dominance orientation were associated with less
positive perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities. However, SDO did not have a significant
indirect effect on perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities via perceptions of race-based
inequities or attitudes toward diversity (B = -.318, z = -1.133, p > .05). Therefore,
hypothesis 3b was partially supported.
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Hypothesis 3c posited that individuals displaying higher levels of social
dominance orientation would have more negative affective reactions and, by extension,
fewer positive affective reactions to beneficiaries of affirmative action. In addition, this
relationship was expected to be partially mediated by perceptions of inequities and
attitudes toward diversity. Both SDO and negative affective reactions to beneficiaries
were scored such that higher scores reflect lower levels of the construct. The
unstandardized solution indicates that SDO does have a significant direct effect on both
negative affective reactions to beneficiaries (B = 2.370, z = 4.388, p < .05) and positive
affective reactions to beneficiaries (B = 1.973, z = 4.419, p < .05). Thus, a 1-point
increase in SDO is associated with a 2.37-point decrease in negative affective reactions to
beneficiaries and a 1.97-point increase in positive affective reactions to beneficiaries.
This means that individuals with higher levels of social dominance orientation also
displayed more negative affective reactions to beneficiaries and fewer positive affective
reactions to beneficiaries.
Social dominance orientation also had a significant indirect effect on both
negative affective reactions (B = -1.444, z = -2.646, p < .05) and positive affective
reactions to beneficiaries (B = -.899, z = -2.160, p < .05) transmitted via perceptions of
inequities and attitudes toward diversity. The Sobel test indicates that the indirect effect
of SDO on negative affective reactions to beneficiaries was transmitted via attitudes
toward diversity (B = -1.474, z = -2.78, p = .01), but not perceptions of inequities (B =
.031, z = .71, p = .48). Similarly, the indirect effect of SDO on positive affective
reactions to beneficiaries was also transmitted via attitudes toward diversity (B = -.929, z
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= -2.26, p = .02), but not perceptions of inequities (B = .030, z = .695, p = .49).
Therefore, hypothesis 3c received only partial support.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION
In the present study, social dominance theory (SDT) was used as a framework for
understanding reactions to affirmative action policies and beneficiaries. Specifically, this
study examined how social dominance orientation, perceptions of inequities, and attitudes
toward diversity impact these reactions. Three hypotheses derivable from social
dominance theory were examined in the study: (1) Gender should have a significant
impact on SDO, endorsement of hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths, and support
for affirmative action. (2) High levels of SDO should be associated with endorsement of
hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths, and consequently, more negative attitudes
toward affirmative action. (3) High levels of SDO should be associated with
endorsement of hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths, which should lead to more
negative attitudes toward beneficiaries of affirmative action.
Gender Effects
While several of the predictions derivable from SDT were supported by the
results, the overall pattern of findings suggests that SDT may not explain all of the
underlying mechanisms driving reactions to policies and beneficiaries. This was
demonstrated by the fact that the fit of the proposed model was only marginally adequate.
This is also demonstrated by several counterintuitive findings based on SDT. Social
dominance theory predicts that, in general, members of dominant social groups display
higher levels of social dominance orientation than members of subordinate social groups.
This finding has been replicated in dominant and subordinate groups based on race,
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ethnicity and a number of other socially constructed categories (Sidanius, Levin & Pratto,
1996; Levin & Sidanius, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). However, differences between
dominant and subordinate social groups, in terms of SDO, have been documented most
consistently among males and females (Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto, Stallworth & Sidanius,
1997; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1994). Moreover, these gender differences have been
shown to hold across various cultural and situational conditions like age, political
ideology, religious beliefs, income, and education (Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1994;
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
Contrary to expectations, although gender did have a significant impact on SDO
only small differences were found between males and females. Nevertheless, the
relationship was in the hypothesized direction. The dominant social group, males,
exhibited higher levels of social dominance orientation than the subordinate social group,
females. Therefore, males displayed a greater preference than females for statements that
maximized the power disparity between dominant and subordinate social groups.
However, the effect of gender on social dominance orientation was not robust. Gender
accounted for less than 4% of the variability in social dominance orientation.
Nonetheless, the effect of gender on SDO is statistically significant, consistent with
previous theory and findings, and consistent with the predictions derived from SDT.
A plausible explanation for the weak effect of gender on social dominance
orientation may stem from the sample used in the study. The sample consisted only of
students studying psychology. Previous research suggests that students’ choice of
academic major may influence their attitudes (Guimond, 1992). Moreover, there is a
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substantial amount of evidence indicating that students differ greatly in their social and
political views as a function of their academic major (Altemeyer, 1988; Guimond, 1998;
Sidanius, Pratto, Martin & Stallworth, 1991). Overall, students studying the social
sciences have been found to be relatively liberal and hold progressive views when
compared with students studying subjects like commerce and law. Moreover, social
dominance theory posits that many occupations may be categorized as either hierarchyenhancing or hierarchy-attenuating. For example, occupations like police officer
reinforce group inequality and are, therefore, considered hierarchy-enhancing. In
contrast, hierarchy-enhancing occupations such as social worker function to mitigate
group inequality. Since some form of educational training is required for entry into many
occupations, by extension, various academic majors may also be classified as either
hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchy-attenuating.
As a social science, psychology could be classified as a hierarchy-attenuating
academic major. Based solely on this fact, it is reasonable to assume that both male and
female psychology students would exhibit low levels of SDO. Supporting this
assumption, Dambrun and colleagues (2002) found that students majoring in psychology
displayed lower levels of social dominance orientation than students majoring in law, a
hierarchy-enhancing academic major. In addition, no gender differences were observed
in SDO for psychology students, but gender differences were observed for law students.
Male law students were more social dominance oriented than female law students. These
findings provide evidence that choice of academic major may impact levels of social
dominance orientation.
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Social dominance theory also suggests that the adoption of certain types of belief
systems, called legitimizing myths, should differ as a function of gender. Legitimizing
myths act to either promote or undermine hierarchical social structures. While there is
little empirical evidence linking gender with endorsement of either hierarchy-enhancing
or hierarchy-attenuating ideologies it seems reasonable to assume that women would
have a preference for hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths. Typically, individuals
high in SDO tend to endorse ideologies that strengthen the social hierarchy while those
low in SDO tend to endorse ideologies that function to weaken the social hierarchy
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Since women have consistently been found to exhibit lower
levels of SDO a logical extension of this finding suggests that women would also endorse
hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths to a greater degree, as well.
In the present study, two legitimizing myths were examined: perceptions of racebased inequities in educational opportunities and attitudes toward diversity. These myths
may be either hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchy-attenuating. For instance, denying the
existence of race-based inequities or denying the value of diversity serves to maintain the
current social hierarchy and, as a result, these myths are hierarchy-enhancing. On the
other hand, perceiving the disparities between African-Americans and White Americans
in educational opportunities as inequitable or holding positive attitudes toward diversity
promotes social equality and, as a result, these myths would be hierarchy-attenuating. No
significant differences were found between male and female participants in terms of the
extent to which each of the legitimizing myths were endorsed.
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Based on their status as a subordinate social group, we expected women to
endorse both hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths to a greater degree than men.
However, no gender differences were found. Drawing upon a sample consisting only of
psychology students may also account for the absence of gender effects in endorsement
of the legitimizing ideologies examined in the study. A study by Guimond (2000) found
that students in a hierarchy-enhancing course of study were more likely than students in a
hierarchy-attenuating major to internalize beliefs that legitimize the economic disparities
between social groups. If it is the case that the absence of gender effects is due to the
sampling only psychology students, then overall levels of both perceptions of inequities
and attitudes toward diversity should be fairly high and consistent across male and female
participants.
Examination of the factor means shows that the expected pattern of results was
observed for attitudes toward diversity, but not for perceptions of race-based inequities.
The mean level of attitudes toward diversity indicates that the sample as a whole
exhibited positive attitudes toward diversity. In addition, mean levels of attitudes toward
diversity for male and female participants were essentially equivalent. Therefore, while
there is empirical evidence demonstrating that, in general, women have more positive
attitudes toward diversity (Holladay, Knight, Paige & Quinones, 2003; Pascarella et al.,
1996) both male and female participants displayed positive attitudes toward diversity.
This finding supports the idea that the lack of a gender effect for attitudes toward
diversity may be due to the sampling of students in a hierarchy-attenuating course of
study.
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It is important to note that the overall mean for perceptions of inequities was
slightly lower than the midpoint of the scale indicating that educational disparities
between African-Americans and White Americans were perceived to be neither equitable
nor inequitable. While levels of perceived inequities were consistent across men and
women the overall level of perceived inequities suggests that it may be the case that
attitudes toward diversity are more strongly related to choosing a hierarchy attenuating
major than are perceptions of inequities. Perceptions of inequities may be less logically
tied to hierarchy-attenuating majors and determined by factors that are external like
simple perceptions about representation of African Americans in higher education.
Another unexpected finding is the lack of gender effects in attitudes toward
affirmative action. There is a substantial body of literature demonstrating that, overall
women display more positive attitudes toward affirmative action policies of all types.
For example, Ozawa and colleagues (1996) found that women had more positive attitudes
toward both “soft” and “hard” forms of affirmative action policies. This finding has been
replicated in student samples, as well (Kravitz & Platania, 1993). In addition, SDT
predicts that women would have more favorable attitudes toward affirmative action
because of their status as a subordinate social group. However, no such differences were
found in the present study. Moreover, the mean level of support for “soft” preferential
treatment was fairly low and consistent across both genders. Therefore, the finding is
unlikely to result from the sampling of students in a hierarchy-attenuating major.
Blumer’s (1958) group position theory may provide an explanation for the lack of
gender effects in reactions to “soft” preferential treatment. According to the theory,
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white females would display policy preferences similar to those of white males because
of their sense of shared group position. Similarly, several social dominance theorists
have suggested that because white females and white males share the same position in the
racial hierarchy, it is in their collective interest to protect and even legitimize their greater
resources and privileges (Bob & Fox, 2003; Sears, Sidanius & Bobo, 2000). Intuitively,
one would think that, because of their disadvantaged status relative to white males, white
females would be more sympathetic to other disadvantaged groups. However, it may be
the case that because of their subordinate status, it is in white females’ self-interest to
maintain, legitimate, and even maximize race-based inequalities and, therefore, the
privileges of whiteness (Alcoff, 1999). In this study, race was made particularly salient
and may have evoked more negative responses from females than research on sex-based
affirmative action. Thus, promoting racial equality in the form of preferences for
African-Americans may be perceived as threatening by white females. If this is the case,
then it makes sense that white females’ level of support for “soft” preferential treatment
would be low and equivalent to that of white males.
SDO and Policy Reactions
Another counterintuitive finding of the study was the lack of a direct relationship
between SDO and reactions to affirmative action. The number of studies demonstrating a
relationship between SDO and reactions to affirmative action and similar policies
suggests that this relationship is robust (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
However, in the current study the effect of SDO on reactions to affirmative action was
completely mediated by perceptions of race-based inequities and attitudes toward
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diversity. This finding appears to have a statistical, rather than theoretical explanation.
Review of the bivariate factor correlation between SDO and reactions to affirmative
action (r = .49) indicates that a moderate relationship does exist. Therefore, it appears
that the lack of a direct relationship between the factors in the full structural model is the
result of highly correlated predictors.
In the present study, the predictors, SDO and attitudes toward diversity, were so
highly correlated (r = .91) that they essentially measured the same construct. While this
does not affect the goodness of fit for the proposed model it does create a problem when
trying to isolate the effects of individual predictors. For example, the variance of the
parameter estimates may be inflated which may lead to lack of statistical significance of
individual predictors. In the present study, SDO and attitudes toward diversity had a
bivariate factor correlation of .91 indicating very little unique variance between the
factors. In addition, the bivariate factor correlation between attitudes toward diversity
and reactions to affirmative action policies (r = .48) was virtually identical to that for
SDO and reactions to the policy (r = .49). Therefore, the relationship between SDO and
policy reactions is redundant with the relationship between attitudes toward diversity and
policy reactions. The relationship between SDO and attitudes toward diversity was
extremely high (r=.91) and so these two measures were redundant. When SDO and
attitudes toward diversity were simultaneously included in a full model, only attitudes
toward diversity was significant.
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SDO and Reactions to Beneficiaries
As expected, the results of the study indicate that social dominance orientation
predicts reactions to beneficiaries of affirmative action. Low-SDO participants displayed
greater willingness to work and socialize with African-American beneficiaries than highSDO participants. In addition, participants who were less social dominance oriented also
expressed more positive perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities. Finally, lower levels of
SDO were also associated with more positive emotional reactions to beneficiaries.
These findings are basically consistent with SDT, which predicts that social
dominance orientation should be associated with attitudes toward various social groups.
Specifically, SDT suggests that individuals who are high in social dominance orientation
prefer members of high-status groups and discriminate against members of stigmatized
out-groups. Moreover, the results reinforce previous research demonstrating that highly
social dominance oriented individuals were more negative toward stigmatized outgroups,
including African-Americans (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
They are also in line with a study showing that individuals displaying higher levels of
SDO were less likely to perceive outgroup members as intelligent as those displaying
lower levels of SDO.
The hypothesized relationships between SDO and the three aspects of reactions to
beneficiaries were in the anticipated direction, however, the factor means indicate that for
both high- and low-SDO participants reactions were either neutral or slightly negative.
The most positive reaction was found for willingness to work and socialize with
beneficiaries. However, the mean of the factor was only slightly above the scale
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midpoint indicating that participants were willing to interact with African-American
beneficiaries only to a moderate degree. The mean for perceptions of beneficiaries’
abilities was also only slightly above the scale midpoint indicating that, overall,
participants perceived beneficiaries to be neither qualified nor unqualified to enter
college. In contrast, the mean of emotional reactions to beneficiaries indicates that
participants’ affect toward beneficiaries was slightly negative.
Relatively little empirical evidence exists which specifically links SDO and
affective, behavioral, or cognitive reactions to beneficiaries of affirmative action.
Nevertheless, social dominance theory posits that out-group denigration may be used by
members of dominant groups to maintain their superior position in the social hierarchy.
This suggests that dominant group members may view advancements made by
subordinate groups as zero-sum gains: gains made by the subordinate group result in
losses for the dominant group. Indeed, SDO has been found to have a significant
correlation with zero-sum beliefs regarding job competition (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson &
Armstrong, 2001). Therefore, dominant group members’ reactions to members of
subordinate groups may be influenced by the degree to which subordinates are perceived
to threaten the dominant groups’ resources. Consistent with this statement, group
dominance concerns have been found to motivate greater discrimination against
outgroups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
Dominant group members’ reactions to subordinates may be even more
pronounced when they are also beneficiaries of affirmative action. Because affirmative
action is often believed to involve preferential treatment members of dominant social
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groups may perceive beneficiaries as a threat to their dominant social position (Blanchard
& Crosby, 1989). If this is the case, then it makes sense that participants would devalue
beneficiaries’ qualifications and abilities. Empirical evidence exists supporting this
statement. Aquino and colleagues (2005) found that, for individuals high in SDO,
African-Americans were negatively evaluated in terms of both their job performance and
career progression. Moreover, performance expectations became even more negative
when African-Americans were perceived to have benefitted from affirmative action. The
results of the current study reinforce Aquino et al’s findings. Participants displaying
higher levels of SDO also had lower perceptions of beneficiaries’ competence.
Legitimizing Myths
According to SDT, individual differences in social dominance orientation
influence whether people adopt hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchy-attenuating
legitimizing myths. The type of legitimizing myth people adopt influences their support
for the social policies and practices that distribute positive social value within the social
hierarchy. In practical terms, in order for a particular belief system to function as a
legitimizing myth it must mediate the relationship between SDO and policy attitudes.
The present study looked at two legitimizing myths: perceptions of race-based inequities
and attitudes toward diversity. Both legitimizing myths can function as either hierarchyenhancing or hierarchy-attenuating. We predicted that endorsement of these ideologies,
in either form, would mediate the relationship between SDO and attitudes toward “soft”
preferential treatment and beneficiaries of affirmative action. Specifically, we predicted
that for those high in SDO perceptions of race-based inequities and attitudes toward
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diversity would be adopted in their hierarchy-enhancing form. In contrast, for those low
in SDO both ideologies would function as hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths.
Moreover, whether individuals adopted the legitimizing ideologies in their hierarchyenhancing or hierarchy-attenuating forms was expected to predict support for affirmative
action and attitudes toward beneficiaries of affirmative action.
For the most part, the findings regarding legitimizing myths were consistent with
the social dominance theory perspective. The legitimizing myths functioned as
anticipated for both high- and low-SDO participants. In other words, based on whether
the participants were high or low in SDO the legitimizing myths were adopted in their
hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchy-attenuating form in order to justify participants’ policy
reactions. In terms of support for affirmative action, lower levels of social dominance
orientation were associated with greater perceptions of race-based inequities and more
positive attitudes toward diversity which, in turn, were associated with more positive
attitudes toward affirmative action policies. Thus, low-SDO participants perceived
greater inequities in educational opportunities and had more positive attitudes toward
diversity in order to justify their support for the “soft” preferential treatment policy. The
reverse was true for individuals who were more social dominance oriented. Higher levels
of SDO were associated with fewer perceptions of race-based inequities and less positive
attitudes toward diversity which was associated with more negative attitudes toward
affirmative action policies. Therefore, high-SDO participants perceived fewer inequities
in educational opportunities and had less positive attitudes toward diversity in order to
rationalize their opposition to the “soft” preferential treatment policy.
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Particularly noteworthy is the fact that endorsement of these legitimizing myths
completely mediated the relationship between SDO and attitudes toward “soft”
preferential treatment. However, this is likely due, at least in part, to the high degree of
multicollinearity between SDO and attitudes toward diversity. Nonetheless, this finding
supports SDT’s contention that individuals high in SDO are likely to adopt belief systems
that rationalize their preference for social policies and practices that promote group
inequality while those who are low in SDO tend to adopt attitudes that legitimize their
preference for policies and practices that mitigate social inequality. In fact, in the current
study, SDO almost completely overlapped with attitudes toward diversity. This suggests
that measurement of SDO may need to incorporate attitudes toward diversity and that the
two measures actually represented a single construct.
Interestingly, while perceptions of race-based inequities mediated the relationship
between SDO and policy reactions it did not mediate the relationship between SDO and
reactions to beneficiaries. Previous research suggests that reactions to policies may be
based on relatively impersonal factors, like beliefs regarding the representation of
African-Americans in higher education, while reactions to beneficiaries may be based on
factors like personal characteristics of beneficiaries (Edwards et al., 2004). Therefore, it
may be the case that somewhat different cognitive processes influence reactions to
policies and beneficiaries. It appears that perceptions of inequitable opportunities may
trigger one to make a determination regarding the need for affirmative action. However,
it is unlikely that such a cognitive process would be necessary to determine one’s own
willingness to interact with members of an outgroup or to make evaluations of others’
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qualifications and abilities. Nevertheless, it does seem appropriate that generalized
attitudes toward those who are different would have implications for reactions to
beneficiaries of affirmative action. So while perceptions of inequities were used to
justify either support or opposition to the “soft” preferential treatment policy beliefs
regarding the representation of African-Americans in higher education were not relevant
to participant reactions to beneficiaries of affirmative action.
Attitudes toward diversity mediated the relationships between SDO and two of
the three dimensions of reactions to beneficiaries: willingness to work and socialize with
beneficiaries and emotional reactions to beneficiaries. Thus, participants’ attitudes
toward diversity functioned to justify both their willingness to work and socialize with
beneficiaries and their emotional reactions to beneficiaries. Specifically, low-SDO
participants had more positive attitudes toward diversity which led to greater willingness
to interact with beneficiaries and more positive feelings toward beneficiaries. In contrast,
high-SDO participants displayed less positive attitudes toward diversity, which led to
them also having less positive reactions to beneficiaries.
Contrary to expectations, attitudes toward diversity did not mediate the
relationship between social dominance orientation and perceptions of beneficiaries’
abilities. While attitudes toward diversity were influenced by SDO the proposed
mediator did not have a significant impact on perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities. SDO
had only a direct effect on perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities. This finding suggests
that, unlike willingness to work and socialize with beneficiaries and affective reactions to
beneficiaries, perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities are not based on internal
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characteristics of the individual. Instead, the lack of a mediating effect may indicate that
separate cognitive processes drive the cognitive and affective and behavioral components
of reactions to beneficiaries.
With the exception of perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities, the findings are
consistent with a number of other studies that provide support for social dominance
theory. Several studies have demonstrated that individuals who are more social
dominance oriented tend to endorse hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing ideologies. For
example, Pratto and colleagues (1994) found that individuals with a preference for group
dominance were more likely to endorse ideologies like political-economic conservatism,
cultural elitism and nationalism. A greater preference for group dominance was also
found to be associated with endorsement of anti-female sexism. In contrast, Foels and
Pappas (2004) found that lower levels of SDO were associated with endorsement of
feminist ideology. High levels of SDO have been found to be associated with greater
prejudice and stronger beliefs in stereotypes targeting African-Americans (Quist &
Resendez, 2002). Two of the stereotypic beliefs examined in the study are especially
relevant: beliefs regarding the intelligence of African-Americans and beliefs regarding
whether African-Americans are hardworking or lazy. Greater endorsement of these
beliefs among individuals who are more social dominance oriented is especially telling
since such beliefs have previously and, to some extent, are currently maintained to justify
the exclusion of African-Americans from higher education.
Previous research has also demonstrated the relationship between endorsement of
legitimizing ideologies and social policy attitudes, specifically in reference to affirmative
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action. While little, if any, empirical research specifically examines perceptions of racebased inequities the findings reinforce the results of previous studies investigating the
impact of beliefs regarding equal opportunity on attitudes toward affirmative action. For
example, Bobo and Kluegel (1993) found that perceived discrimination was a strong
predictor of support for policies aimed at enhancing opportunities and incomes for
African-Americans. Similarly, Kluegel and Smith (1983) found that a general belief that
group-based disparities in opportunities exists was related to more favorable attitudes
toward an affirmative action policy involving preferential treatment. However, for those
who displayed a preference for inequality (high SDO) attitudes toward the policy were
more negative, even when these individuals acknowledged that race-based disparities in
opportunity do exist. While greater perceptions of inequities were associated with more
positive attitudes toward the affirmative action policy, examination of the scale mean
indicates that, overall, reactions to the policy were negative. According to Kravitz and
colleagues (1997), this may be due to a belief among many White Americans that
discrimination is a problem of the past and, therefore, there is no need for affirmative
action. Alternatively, one may believe that race based disparities exist but oppose the
policies for reasons irrelevant to Social Dominance, such as opposition to government
intervention in business or rejection of the use of any criterion other than perceived
competence as a factor in employment decisions.
Research suggests that a number of beliefs regarding affirmative action are
adopted to justify either support for or opposition to the policy. Among these beliefs is a
belief in the value of diversity. Valuing diversity has been found to be associated with
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generalized support for affirmative action (Aberson & Haag, 2003). In addition, placing
a greater value on diversity was also found to predict support for a preferential treatment
policy similar to that examined in the present study.
While there is little research examining the impact of legitimizing myths on
reactions to beneficiaries SDT suggests that, based on their level of SDO, individuals
may adopt certain beliefs regarding group-based dominance to cognitively justify the
subordinate status of subordinate groups, like African-Americans. This, in turn, may
affect their evaluations of an African-American affirmative action beneficiary. As stated
previously, individuals displaying higher levels of SDO are expected to adopt hierarchyenhancing beliefs which should results in negative evaluations of beneficiaries.
However, to the extent that individuals exhibit low levels of SDO and adopt hierarchyattenuating beliefs evaluations of beneficiaries are expected to be more positive. The
results supported this contention. Participants who were more social dominance oriented
displayed more negative reactions to diversity which were associated with less
willingness to interact with beneficiaries and negative affective reactions to beneficiaries.
The reverse was true for participants who were less social dominance oriented. These
individuals exhibited more positive reactions to diversity, as well as greater willingness
to interact with beneficiaries and more positive affect.
Social dominance theory also posits that SDO predicts individuals’ preference for
members of various social groups. Specifically, high levels of SDO are associated with a
preference for high status groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Therefore, it seems
reasonable that individuals exhibiting lower levels of SDO would be more open to
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diversity and, therefore, members of disadvantaged groups. Valuing diversity has been
demonstrated to have an effect on social interactions between dominant and subordinate
group members. Tropp and Bianchi (2006) found that, among Whites, valuing diversity
had a significant positive relationship with interest in intergroup contact. Results of the
present study also indicate that the degree to which individuals value diversity predicts
willingness to interact with members of disadvantaged groups. Dominant group
members who placed greater value on diversity were more willing to work and socialize
with African-American beneficiaries of affirmative action. These findings underscore the
importance of recognizing the value of diversity for reactions to both affirmative action
policies and beneficiaries.
Limitations
An obvious limitation of this study is its sole reliance on survey measures. Use of
surveys as the sole method of data collection may raise several concerns. First, the use of
self-report measures of attitudes and behaviors may often be associated with a tendency
for participants to give socially desirable responses. Rather than responding to the survey
items in a truthful manner, participants may respond in such a way as to represent
themselves favorably. To the extent that this occurs, the validity of the study is
compromised. Due to the potentially controversial nature of the topics addressed, the
present study would seem to be particularly susceptible to socially desirable responding.
However, these effects should be mitigated, to some degree, by the anonymity of
participants’ responses, as well as the fact that there is no audience since the surveys were
completed via the internet. Furthermore, the relatively modest levels of support for
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affirmative action policies suggest that respondents did not feel compelled to provide
overly positive evaluations of this controversial policy.
Use of survey measures may also limit the external validity of the study. This is
because the surveys used in the present study artificially limited information on
beneficiaries and organizations to just data regarding affirmative action. In real-world
situations individuals would likely have additional information about beneficiaries and
the organization which may impact attitudes toward affirmative action policies and/or
beneficiaries.
Another possible limitation of the study is that reactions to “soft” preferential
treatment may not generalize to other forms of affirmative action. It is possible that
reactions to other forms of affirmative action may be quite different than the reactions
found in the present study. For instance, reactions to hard preferential treatment or quota
systems are often significantly more negative, and reactions to recruiting minorities are
often more positive (Kravitz et al., 1997). This is not a major concern, however, since a
similar form of affirmative action has been upheld by the Supreme Court. Therefore,
stronger forms of affirmative action are unlikely to be adopted by institutions on a
voluntary basis. In addition, reactions to weaker forms of affirmative action tend to be
more positive (Kravitz & Platania, 1993; Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000). Thus, reactions to
the affirmative action policy used in the study should be fairly realistic.
A limitation of the study associated with SDT is that social dominance orientation
is a one-dimensional construct. Basically, SDO assumes that social hierarchies are based
on only one characteristic, such as race or gender. In reality, social hierarchies may be
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determined by an interaction between various characteristics. For example, young black
females are likely to occupy a much different position in the social hierarchy than old
white males. In addition, it may be possible to have high SDO based on a characteristic
such as race and low SDO based on a characteristic such as income or intelligence. It
may be the case that a more comprehensive understanding of SDO would stem from
examining individual differences in SDO as a function of these different characteristics.
Clearly, more research is needed to fully understand the combined effects of these
different demographic characteristics on social dominance and subsequent attitudes.
A final limitation of the study concerns the use of structural equation modeling.
While there are several advantages associated with this statistical technique a major
limitation is its inability to prove the soundness of one model over another. Because the
“fit” of the model is determined by the degree to which the model implied relationships
reproduce the relationships observed in the data it is possible to have several different
models that fit the data equally well. Furthermore, the fit is determined based on
characteristics of one existing dataset, and the model that works with one dataset may not
generalize to a new dataset.
Suggestions for Future Research
The results and limitations of the study suggest a number of avenues for future
research. First, an investigation using a more heterogeneous sample would benefit the
examination of the effect of type of academic major (hierarchy-attenuatinge v. hierarchyenhancing) on SDO and, subsequently, attitudes toward affirmative action in higher
education. Many affirmative action programs in higher education are specific to
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particular academic majors (i.e., recruiting minorities and women into engineering).
Therefore, more research is needed to provide a better understanding of how such
policies may be evaluated by non-beneficiaries, as well as, the implications of these
evaluations for attitudes toward beneficiaries.
Finally, further empirical research is needed to fully understand gender
differences in racial and policy attitudes. The findings from the present study indicated
that female participants were no more likely than male participants to endorse the idea of
affirmative action. This result is incongruent with social dominance theory which
suggests that, because of their disadvantaged status, white females should display more
positive attitudes toward policies intended to promote social equality (Pratto et al., 1994).
However, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) posits that people have several
“selves” that correspond to their membership in any number of social groups. Different
social contexts may trigger the salience of one “self” over another. Since responses were
more negative for measures that explicitly referenced African-Americans it may be the
case that these measures triggered participants’ “white” identity rather than their
“female” identity.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while several of the predictions derived from SDT were supported
by the results some unexpected findings seem to suggest that SDT does not explain all of
the underlying mechanisms driving reactions to affirmative action policies and
beneficiaries. For example, inconsistent with previous research few differences were
observed between male and female participants (Kravitz & Platania; Pratto et al., 1994).
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All of the participants study psychology, a hierarchy-attenuating academic major, which
may account for the lack of gender differences found for SDO and attitudes toward
diversity (Dambrun et al., 2002). However, this does not seem to be a plausible
explanation for the lack of gender differences in attitudes toward a “soft” preferential
treatment policy.
In addition, despite the fact that the sample as a whole exhibited low levels of
SDO and positive attitudes toward diversity, reactions to both policies and beneficiaries
were fairly negative. Curiously, reactions were most negative on those measures which
explicitly reference African-Americans: perceptions of inequities, affective reactions to
beneficiaries, and attitudes toward “soft” preferential treatment. These findings suggest
that self-interest, racism, or both may have influenced participants’ reactions.
Furthermore, it may be the case that perceptions of inequities and attitudes toward
affirmative action are impacted by race neutral beliefs such as resistance to government
enforced regulation of admission decisions or race neutral erroneous beliefs about the
representation of African Americans in higher education.
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Appendix A
Description of “Soft” Preferential Treatment

Description of Soft Preferential Treatment
Preferential treatment is a form of affirmative action. In preferential treatment, college
applicants are evaluated in terms of their qualifications. The most qualified applicant is
admitted. However, in a situation where an African-American and a White applicant are
equally qualified, the African-American applicant will be selected.
Preferential treatment may be voluntarily adopted if a college or university has evidence
that African-Americans are underrepresented in the student body. In addition,
institutions may adopt preferential treatment to encourage the entry of African-Americans
into a given discipline or course of study.
The scales given below indicate possible ways to describe preferential treatment. Please
indicate your attitude toward preferential treatment coding in the appropriate number.
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Appendix B
Measures
Social Dominance Orientation
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other
groups.
3. It is okay if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
6. It is probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are
at the bottom.
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
9. It would be good if groups could be equal.
10. Group equality should be our ideal.
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
13. Increased social equality is something we should strive for.
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.
16. No one group should dominate in society.
Perceptions of Race-Based Inequities
1. Race plays an important role in determining who has the opportunity to attend
college.
2. The high cost of higher education prevents many qualified African-American
students from attending college.
3. White high school graduates are more likely than African-American high school
graduates to attend college because they are better prepared academically.
4. Many academically qualified African-American students are unable to attend
college because it is too expensive.
5. More White high school graduates attend college than African-American high
school graduates.
6. White students have more opportunities to attend college than African-American
students.
7. Academically qualified White students are more likely to attend prestigious
universities than academically qualified African-American students.
8. African-American high school students tend to be recruited by less selective
colleges and universities than White high school students.
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9. African-American students often face obstacles that prevent them from attending
college.
Attitudes Toward Diversity Scale
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

I support university efforts to increase diversity.
I believe diversity enriches my college education.
Increased diversity will help Clemson become a top university.
I believe that racial diversity is beneficial to students.
I believe multicultural course requirements do little to improve race relations.
Learning about different cultures is an important part of my college education.
Contact with individuals whose background is different from my own is an
essential part of my college education.
8. Having cross-racial friendships is not more difficult than having same-sex
friendships.

Attitudes Toward “Soft” Preferential Treatment Scale
1. The idea that affirmative action admits too many students who have a low chance
of academic success is a misconception.
2. All colleges and universities should have an affirmative action program.
3. Federal law should be changed to make affirmative action illegal.
4. It is reasonable for colleges and universities to give special consideration for
admission to minorities.
5. I believe the Supreme Court was wise to uphold affirmative action in college and
university admissions.
6. Overall, affirmative action is a good idea.
7. I support the use of affirmative action in college and university admissions.
Willingness to Work and Socialize with Beneficiaries
1. I would be less friendly to a student who was admitted under affirmative action.
2. If I knew a student was admitted under affirmative action, I would be less likely
to help them with classwork.
3. I would have no interest in socializing with a student I knew was admitted under
affirmative action.
4. I would be less likely to be pleasant to a fellow student if I thought they were
admitted through affirmative action.
5. Socially, I would feel less comfortable around a student admitted under
affirmative action than around other students.
6. I would prefer not to be in a work-group with a student admitted under an
affirmative action policy.
7. I would feel resentful toward an affirmative action beneficiary if I had to work in
a group with them.
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Need to Belong
1. Overall, my group memberships have a great deal to do with how I feel about
myself.
2. The social groups I belong to are an important reflection of who I am.
3. The social groups I belong to are important to my sense of what kind of person I
am.
4. In general, belonging to social groups is an important part of my self-image.
Perceptions of Beneficiaries’ Abilities
Directions: Think about an African-American student admitted to Clemson University
through an affirmative action program consisting of “soft” preferential treatment.
Relative to a student who was not admitted to Clemson through an affirmative action
program, rate the following:
1. How qualified you believe this individual is to attend college.
2. How well-equipped this individual is to complete course-related assignments,
based on their qualifications.
3. How well you expect this individual to perform in college.
4. How effective you think this individual will be in completing assignments on
time.
5. How effective you think this individual will be in completing assignments with a
high degree of accuracy.
6. How likely would you be to seek help with course assignments from this
individual.
7. In relation to other students, how much effort you expect this individual to exert
in completing course assignments.
8. How much of the requisite knowledge needed to complete assignments do you
expect this individual to possess?
9. How likely you think it is that this individual will graduate in four years.
10. How likely you think it is that this individual will graduate with honors.
11. Rate how likely you think it is that this individual will attend graduate school.
12. How likely you think it is that this individual will graduate with a GPA of 3.0 or
higher.
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Indicate the degree to which you feel the following reactions to those who benefit
from an affirmative action policy that entails “soft” preferential treatment.
Responses range from “1” for not at all to “7” for extreme.
Affective Reactions to Beneficiaries
1. Hostility
2. Admiration
3. Disliking
4. Acceptance
5. Superiority
6. Affection
7. Disdain
8. Approval
9. Hatred
10. Sympathy
11. Rejection
12. Warmth
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Appendix C
Descriptive Statistics for Factor Indicators
VARIABLE

GENDER

SDO1

SDO2

SDO4

SDO5

MEAN
STANDARD DEV.

1.5896
.4929

2.4223
1.7126

2.8287
1.6293

2.5521
1.6058

2.6494
1.5429

VARIABLE

SDO7

SDO8

SDO9

MEAN
STANDARD DEV.

2.2510
1.3464

2.7171
1.5861

5.7450
1.2739

5.6534
1.3036

VARIABLE

SDO12

SDO13

SDO14

SDO16

MEAN
STANDARD DEV.

5.4746
1.3431

5.6920
1.2281

5.5628
1.4014

5.1137
1.5373

3.8207
1.6887

VARIABLE

POI5

POI6

POI7

POI8

POI9

MEAN
STANDARD DEV.

3.2112
1.6992

3.8312
1.6682

4.2995
1.5369

3.5100
1.5320

4.2948
1.6201

VARIABLE

ATD1

ATD2

ATD3

ATD4

ATD5

MEAN
STANDARD DEV.

5.5170
1.2696

5.4542
1.3449

5.2145
1.4276

5.5518
1.2245

4.5866
1.5539

VARIABLE

ATD6

MEAN
STANDARD DEV.

5.0159
1.4028

4.6214
1.4188

5.0598
1.3388

4.8367
1.4090

4.5454
1.5574

VARIABLE

SOFT1

SOFT2

SOFT3

SOFT4

SOFT5

MEAN
STANDARD DEV.

4.1713
1.4389

3.1713
1.5819

3.9084
1.7238

3.4422
1.6946

3.6147
1.6140

VARIABLE

SOFT6

SOFT7

WWS1

WWS2

WWS3

MEAN
STANDARD DEV.

3.5100
1.6355

3.3865
1.6487

5.7035
1.5836

5.7809
1.4899

5.9262
1.3486

BELONG1
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BELONG2

SDO10

BELONG3

SDO11
6.2107
1.0462

POI3

BELONG4

VARIABLE

WWS4

WWS5

WWS7

5.8606
1.3915

5.8211
1.3632

5.6285
1.4905

4.6141
1.2670

4.6980
1.2433

VARIABLE

POBA3

POBA4

POBA5

POBA6

POBA7

MEAN
STANDARD DEV.

4.3561
1.1107

4.8369
1.3919

4.6155
1.3988

4.0400
1.4535

4.3636
1.2488

VARIABLE

POBA8

POBA9

POBA10

POBA11

POBA12

MEAN
STANDARD DEV.

3.0851
.7663

4.6089
1.4472

3.7130
1.4274

4.2074
1.4442

4.2709
1.3502

AFFECT1

AFFECT3

AFFECT4

AFFECT5

AFFECT6

5.4167
1.4912

5.7052
1.3888

4.7922
1.4600

5.5697
1.4499

3.3533
1.6213

AFFECT11

AFFECT12

5.8845
1.3471

3.7610
1.5332

MEAN
STANDARD DEV.

VARIABLE
MEAN
STANDARD DEV.

VARIABLE
MEAN
STANDARD DEV.

AFFECT7

AFFECT8

AFFECT9

5.5008
1.5084

4.1086
1.5648

6.0916
1.3607
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POBA1

POBA2

Appendix D
Standardized Factor Loadings for Final Measurement Model
Indicator
SDO 1
SDO 2
SDO 4
SDO 5
SDO 7
SDO 8
SDO 9
SDO 10
SDO 11
SDO 12
SDO 13
SDO 14
SDO 16
POI 3
POI 5
POI 6
POI 7
POI 8
POI 9
ATD 1
ATD 2
ATD 3
ATD 4
ATD 5
ATD 6
Soft 1
Soft 2
Soft 3
Soft 4
Soft 5
Soft 6
Soft 7
WWS 1
WWS 2
WWS 3
WWS 4
WWS 5
WWS 6
WWS 7
POBA 1
POBA 2
POBA 3
POBA 4
POBA 5
POBA 6
POBA 7
POBA 8

OEQ
.691
.604
.661
.797
.793
.812

GBD

POI

ATD

Soft

WWS

POBA

.707
.733
.663
.854
.939
.709
.620
.659
.701
.508
.809
.620
.748
.734
.775
.774
.766
.542
.611
.532
.859
.596
.783
.870
.919
.950
.874
.922
.948
.932
.898
.808
.829
.796
.797
.832
.733
.797
.717
.426
.651
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Aff_N

Aff_P

POBA 9
POBA 10
POBA 11
POBA 12
Affect 1
Affect 3
Affect 5
Affect 7
Affect 9
Affect 11
Affect 4
Affect 6
Affect 8
Affect 12

.799
817
.828
.852
.830
.880
.426
.759
.787
.844
.792
.573
.844
.652

SDO = Social dominance orientation
OEQ = Opposition to equality dimension of SDO
GBD = Group based dominance dimension of SDO
POI = Perceptions of inequities
ATD = Attitudes toward diversity
Soft = Attitudes toward “soft” preferential treatment
WWS = Willingness to work/socialize with beneficiaries
POBA = Perceptions of beneficiaries’ abilities
Affect = Affective reactions to beneficiaries
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